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I. INTRODUCTION
Important shifts in contract doctrine may be traced to certain deci-
sions. Judge Traynor's opinion in Drennan v. Star Paving Co., gave
new, different, and permanent life to the principle of reliance as a
formative device. Judge Cardozo's words in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon2 have indelibly colored application of judicial interpolation of
good faith obligations into contractual relationships. These, and other
such opinions, were the means by which the law of contracts expanded.
They were not necessarily "right" compared to the possible doctrinal
alternatives,3 but they moved the law to new and perhaps higher
ground.
Similarly, in Aluminum Company of America v. Essex Group,
Inc. ("ALCOA"),4 Judge Teitelbaum attempted to fashion a new, ex-
pansive approach to the doctrine of "excuse" ' to determine whether
1 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
2 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
' In this regard, it should be remembered that Judge Cardozo spoke for a four-to-
three majority reversing the decision of a unanimous five judge lower appellate court,
which itself reversed the decision of a trial judge.
4 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980) [hereinafter ALCOA].
5 Commentators theretofore had urged such expansion. See, e.g., Hawkland, The
Energy Crisis and Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 79 CoM. L.J. 75
(1974) (arguing that under U.C.C. § 2-615, contracting parties are competent to write
force majeure clauses into contracts); Jennings, Commercial Impracticability-Does it
Really Exist?, 2 WHITTIER L. REV. 241 (1979); Speidel, Excusable Nonperformance
in Sales Contracts: Some Thoughts About Risk Management, 32 S.C.L. REV. 241, 248
(1980) (discussing the "birth of a more liberal excuse doctrine").
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certain supervening events' relieved Alcoa from performing its contrac-
tual obligations. 7 The exercise, a determination whether the events fit
under the "traditional" excuse rubrics of mistake, impossibility, im-
practicability, or frustration of purpose was not a novel one. Courts had
resolved such questions on a case-by-case basis long before ALCOA.
What was different in ALCOA was Judge Teitelbaum's readiness, with
little, if any, supporting authority, to take an expansive view of these
rubrics in finding that Alcoa was entitled to relief.
Had Judge Teitelbaum confined his analysis to broadening the
traditional excuse doctrine, ALCOA might have served as the corner-
stone of a more expansive, or at least more fully integrated, doctrine of
excuse that avoids the anomaly of a doctrine that is hardly ever ap-
plied.' Even a concerted effort to reconcile or reverse his untraditional
findings of mistake, impracticability, and frustration might have pro-
duced a unitary approach to excuse built around the single concept of
fundamental fairness.
Judge Teitelbaum, however, was not content to stop with an ex-
panded concept of relief-supporting events. He took the more radical
step of holding that the supervening events served not to provide an
"excuse" relieving performance, but rather to justify modification of the
performance obligation through the imposition of loss- and risk-shar-
ing: the judicial interpolation of new pricing terms to ameliorate the
perceived hardship caused by the putatively excusing events.9 Here was
6 The supervening events at issue in ALCOA primarily involved the great escala-
tion in the world-wide cost of petroleum-based products that followed from the OPEC
oil crisis in the mid-1970's.
7 Alcoa sought relief from its long-term (fifteen-year) contractual obligation to
process aluminum ore under an aluminum toll conversion contract. The contract fixing
the price to be paid by Essex to Alcoa provided, among other adjustments, for price
adjustment based upon the Wholesale Price Index-Industrial Commodities (WPI).
See ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 56. In consequence of sharply increased fuel costs result-
ing from the OPEC embargo, Alcoa's actual cost of production, of which the principal
element was the generation and consumption of electricity, increased far more sharply
than did the WPI. Although the contract was highly profitable to Alcoa between 1968
and 1974, Alcoa began to sustain losses and projected that if the contract continued
until the expiration of its term in 1983 it would have sustained further losses in excess
of $75 million. See id. at 58-59.
8 See McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765, 775 (W. Va. 1984) (Harshbarger, J.,
concurring) ("[Tlhe commercial impracticability doctrine is recognized, but rarely al-
lowed as an excuse for nonperformance.").
I See ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 78-80. Judge Teitelbaum essentially treated the
matter as one of partial pregnancy-putatively excusing events occur, but do not serve
to excuse. Rather, they serve to justify modification of the performance obligation
through the device of judicial reformation of the express contract. Such reformation
leaves the parties perhaps somewhat less "mistaken," performance not so impracticable,
and the result a bit less frustrating. It was this use of judicial power to implement
concepts of loss-sharing that ultimately engendered both the praise and the scorn lav-
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a radical departure that overshadowed the more subtle, but no less rad-
ical departure embodied in the underlying determination that Alcoa
was not to be held strictly to its voluntarily-assumed contractual
obligations.
Although Judge Teitelbaum's loss-sharing methodology evoked a
flurry'" of both positive'1 and negative 2 commentary, it is perhaps also
responsible for the fact that, in the seven years since the case was de-
cided, ALCOA has had little impact on judicial thought. The judicial
sands seem to have shifted more to cover over the decision than to ex-
pand upon it.' 3 One might then wonder why a decision apparently as
ished upon the decision.
"0 See, e.g., Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: The United
States, 64 B.U.L. REV. 1, 28 (1984) (discussing ALCOA within the context of court-
ordered adjustment to contracts); Goldberg, Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 527; Palay, A Contract Does Not a Contract Make, 1985 Wis. L.
REV. 561; Sirianni, The Developing Law of Contractual Impracticability and Impossi-
bility: Part 1, 14 U.C.C. L.J. 30 (1981); Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. &
CoM. 193 (1982) [hereinafter New Spirit]; Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments
Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 369 (1981) [hereinafter Price
Adjustments]; Trakman, Winner Take Some: Loss Sharing and Commercial Impracti-
cability, 69 MINN. L. REV. 471 (1985); Comment, Court-Imposed Modifications: Sup-
plementing the All-or-Nothing Approach to Discharge Cases, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1079
(1983).
"' Some hailed the decision as the harbinger of the "new spirit" of the law of
contracts. See, e.g., Black, Sales Contracts and Impracticability in a Changing World,
13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 247 (1981); New Spirit, supra note 10; Comment, Equitable Ref-
ormation of Long-Term Contracts-The "New Spirit" of Alcoa, 1982 UTAH L. REV.
985; see also, Trakman, supra note 10, at 471 (finding ALCOA indicative of a move-
ment of the doctrine of impracticability from "a rare all-or-nothing remedy to . . . an
embryonic loss-sharing doctrine").
12 Others condemned the decision. See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 10, at 26, 35
(describing ALCOA as "grotesque," "a lonely monument on a bleak landscape," and
"the frustrated venture of a single trial judge whose fancy was unusually free"); cf.
Sirianni, supra note 10, at 55 ("If other courts adopt the ALCOA test, con-
tracts-especially long-term ones-will become markedly less secure. And there will be
little basis upon which parties might ascertain in advance which contracts are vulnera-
ble to reformation or avoidance.").
1" See, e.g., Printing Indus. Ass'n v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, Local 546, 628 F.
Supp. 1103 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 597 F. Supp. 1456 (E.D. Va. "1984) [hereinafter Westinghouse II]; Printing
Indus. Ass'n v. International Printing & Graphic Communications Union, Local 56,
584 F. Supp. 990 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Freidco, Ltd. v. Farmers' Bank, 529 F. Supp.
822 (D. Del. 1981); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F.
Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981) [hereinafter Westinghouse I]; Louisiana Power & Light v.
Allegheny Ludlum Indus., 517 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. La. 1981); Wabash, Inc. v. Avnet,
Inc., 516 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Wooldridge v. Exxon Corp., 39 Conn. Supp.
190, 473 A.2d 1254 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); see also McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d
765, 780 (W.Va. 1984) (Harshbarger, J., concurring) ("ALCOA has not been cited as
precedent for what it did . . ").
The most recent cases simply ignore the ALCOA decision. See, e.g., Northern Ind.
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986); Waldinger
Corp. v. CRS Group Eng'rs, Inc., 775 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1985); International Miner-
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portentous as ALCOA has virtually faded into obscurity. The answer
lies in an analysis of both the doctrine of excuse14 and the often unar-
ticulated relationship between that doctrine and more fundamental con-
tract doctrine.
It has been suggested that "[ijmpossibility cases are a special breed
of contract law."' 15 I believe, however, that the judicial approach to im-
possibility is consistent with the development of contract law and not
significantly different from the general approach to matters of interpre-
tation and inference in the context of a contractual omission. 6 The fic-
tions that the courts employ and the reliance on presumptions of intent
are essentially the same tools that are applied to other questions of con-
tract interpretation and enforcement." For example, the contractual
fiction of presumed intent allows one to assume that the excuse arises
from the terms of the contract itself rather than from extrinsic stan-
dards."" Adorned with the talisman of intent, the contract is subject to
als & Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 1196 (1986); Valencia Center, Inc. v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 464 So. 2d 1267
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington Pub. Power Supply
Sys., 104 Wash. 2d 353, 705 P.2d 1195 (1985).
Indeed, notwithstanding Judge Teitelbaum's herculean efforts to present his theo-
ries of mistake, impracticability, and frustration for review and acceptance by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, that court urged the parties to settle rather than press their
respective appeals, and the case was settled shortly before it was to be heard. See Ma-
caulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 465, 476 (discussing the
proceedings). Perhaps, as has been suggested, the real value of ALCOA lies in its role
as a coercive force for a mutually agreed upon settlement:
The District Judge's opinion and the uncertain result of the appeal
changed the balance of bargaining power, but it did not impose a final
result on the parties. The decision plus the appellate process worked as a
form of coercive mediation. Faced with the situation, the parties worked
out their own solution.
Id.
14 Assuming contractual silence, the issue is one of allocating the risk and conse-
quences of loss flowing from what has been called a "contractual accident." C. FRIED,
CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 65 (1981). Pro-
fessor Farnsworth refers to the situation as one of casus omissus, the omitted case.
Farnsworth, Disputes over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 860, 860
(1968) ("Sometimes . . .the parties will disagree over what they did not say, over the
effect of their contract on a situation for which they have failed to provide. These
disagreements [are] . . .disputes over omission. They may reflect an understatement of
expectation ...[or] an absence of expectation . . ").
15 Speziale, The Turn of the Twentieth Century as the Dawn of Contract "Inter-
pretation": Reflections in Theories of Impossibility, 17 DuQ. L. REV. 555, 557 (1978).
"8 See Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 881 ("The first step is to determine by the
process of interpretation whether the parties provided for the situation. If they did not,
then the second step is to resolve the casus omissus by the process of inference.").
17 Of course, these fictions carry into the excuse context the same strengths and
weaknesses evident in their more general usage.
18 Cf. C. FRIED, supra note 14, at 61 (noting that judicial determination and
presumed intent itself involve application of "other substantive standards" such as fair-
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judicial interpretation rather than judicial legislation,' 9 and the search
for objective, presumed intent, instead of subjective, actual intent. Ab-
sent an express indication, the fiction creates the presumption that the
parties intended what they reasonably would have articulated expressly
had they been required to deal with the matter at the time of con-
tracting.2" Whatever its failings, judicial implication tends toward the
fostering of justice and fairness, even if at the expense of the application
of firm rules. It is perhaps the special genius of the law to temper the
absolute with reasoned flexibility, even if application is difficult. As
Judge Cardozo stated: "Those who think more of symmetry and logic
in the development of legal rules than of practical adaptation to the
attainment of a just result will be troubled by a classification where the
lines of division are so wavering and blurred."'"
The relationship between the doctrine of excuse and contract doc-
trine works at an even more fundamental level. The "excuse" issue
arises only if there is preceding consensus that contractual obligations
are to be performed, that non-performance will give rise to the law's
enforcement or remedial sanctions.22 Under an approach to contract fo-
cusing on the centrality of the norm of enforcement of the parties' ex-
press agreements, one seeking discharge from a contractual undertaking
must demonstrate either (1) that the promise, by its very terms or from
the circumstances of its making, is excepted from the norm, or (2) that
circumstances exist that give rise to another, excusing norm. Excuse
becomes a stark "either/or" issue that precludes the middle ground of
ness). The fiction, thus, is "that the courts were merely bowing to the 'intention' of the
parties, even where there were no relevant expectations ... [and] that the expectations
of the parties were cast in the form of contract terms." Farnsworth, supra note 14, at
865.
' As one court phrased the issue:
When we turn to the precedents we are met at once with the confu-
sion of statement whether a covenant can be implied only if it was clearly
"intended" by the parties, or whether such a covenant can rest on princi-
ples of equity .... One may ...conclude that in large measure this
confusion arises out of the reluctance of the courts to admit that they were
to a considerable extent "remaking" a contract in situations where it
seemed necessary and appropriate so to do. "Intention of the parties" is a
good formula by which to square doctrine with result. That this is true
has long been an open secret.
Parev Prods. Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, 124 F.2d 147, 149 (2d Cir. 1941).
20 See, e.g., Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 243-44, 129 N.E. 889,
891 (1921) (asserting that an immaterial breach will not serve to discharge the non-
breaching party and using the judicial "fiction" of intent to avoid the imputation of
dependency).
21 Id. at 242-43, 129 N.E. 889, 891.
22 This is so whether or not one accepts the centrality of "promise" to contract.
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contract modification:2" either the defense is allowed and performance
is discharged, or the defense is disallowed and performance is directed
or performance damages are awarded.
If, however, one is more concerned with the relationship that the
contract has established, one might easily define the primary role of
contract doctrine in terms of nurturing, fostering, and perpetuating that
relationship.2 The parties themselves should cope with disruptive
events not expressly provided for in the contract while they go about
the rest of their business together.25 The contract is a skeleton-like
structure upon which the relationship is built, designed to do little more
than describe the general policy governing the relationship.28 Under
this view, when a supervening event renders a party's performance im-
practicable, fairness within the context of the relationship may require
a sharing of the consequential losses between the parties.2" It is not
unreasonable to posit an unarticulated "duty to adjust," an obligation
on the part of one party not only to act in good faith, but also to agree
to an adjustment of the contract terms in order to avoid any fortuitous
advantage at the expense of the other party.28
Inevitably, then, to define a doctrine of excuse is to define a doc-
23 But cf. Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 884 (suggesting that "where there is a
casus omissus the court is never limited to . . polar alternatives and there is always
the opportunity for appropriate compromise").
24 See Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 854 (1978);
see also Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Con-
tracts, 69 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1985) (discussing, although not accepting, the relational
model); Harrison, A Case for Loss Sharing, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 573, 586-88, 592-95
(1983) (envisioning a "contractual entity," based upon "mutual reliance and consensual
reciprocity inherent in contract," and positing the existence of "contractual cotenancy"
analogous to partnership); Macaulay, supra note 13, at 467 (discussing the effect of
continuing relationships and interdependence on contracting parties).
25 See Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in
Contract Law, 1985 Wisc. L. REV. 565, 569.
26 See Palay, supra note 10, at 562. Comparative reference has been made to the
Japanese model where the "parties do not contemplate the regulation of the relation-
ship. . . by formal legal standards, but rather seek a pattern of continuing association
in which adjustment will be responsive to considerations the law ignores." von Mehren,
Some Reflections on Japanese Law, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1486, 1494 (1958), discussed
in Birmingham, A Second Look at the Suez Canal Cases: Excuse for Non Performance
of Contractual Obligations in the Light of Economic Theory, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1393,
1394 (1969).
217 See New Spirit, supra note 10, at 208-09; Price Adjustments, supra note 10, at
420-21; Speidel, supra note 5, at 273-74; Trakman, supra note 10, at 518-19.
28 See Price Adjustments, supra note 10, at 395-405. This follows from a view of
contract that equates a serious contractual undertaking with the formation of a joint
venture or partnership, carrying with it a mantle of fiduciary, rather than promissory,
obligation. See Harrison, supra note 24, at 592-95 (analogizing contract to
partnership).
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trine of contract.29 Any examination of the doctrine of excuse must con-
sider the doctrine as it has evolved, always understanding that it is a
manifestation of an overall theory of contract. Radical departure from
the way in which the doctrine of excuse is articulated and applied can
be meaningful only if there is consensus for a radical departure from
the way in which we look at contractual relationships. To the extent
that change is advocated in the doctrine of excuse, it must be recognized
that change can follow meaningfully only from more fundamental
change in the reality of contract. It is this reality, as we understand it
through the assimilation of experience, that must inform doctrine. Ulti-
mately, the ALCOA decision has been ineffectual in the development of
a modern approach to excuse because there is no consensus about con-
tract doctrine that can serve as the basis for Judge Teitelbaum's vision.
What follows is an attempt to examine the excuse of commercial
impracticability"0 in terms of what parties to agreements need and what
kind of "glue" 1 contracts can provide for complex relationships.
32
What is ultimately required is a base from which to look at future
events that provides some certainty in planning. A cohesive understand-
ing of the major contractual disruptions of the recent past from which
such a base can emerge has not yet developed. What is needed for the
present are flexible and workable tools rather than all-embracing theo-
ries, and a continuing effort to keep emerging doctrine consonant with
commercial reality.
2 It is not the purpose of this Article to attempt such a sweeping definition or to
add to the current proliferation of all-embracing contract theories. Indeed, with respect
to excuse, sweeping doctrinal generalization poses a danger to coherent thought; there
has been too much contradictory judicial and scholarly activity and too little assimila-
tion of the enormous disruptive events that began in the middle of this century. Con-
tract theory, in seeking neat categorization, all too often misses contract complexity. See
C. FRIED, supra note 14, at 60-69 (noting that many who, like the author, subscribe to
the centrality of promise to contract, nevertheless too readily simplify that doctrine and
force it into tortuous paths in an attempt to make it applicable to sophisticated issues of
impracticability). The literature tends to confuse theories of how contracting parties
ought to behave with actual behavior, leading to the assumption that what ought to be
is.
." The related doctrine of mistake, which consumed a substantial part of the AL-
COA opinion, is not within the scope of this Article.
31 See Kidwell, A Caveat, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 615, 616.
32 In light of my comments above, I should add that such an examination should
not require that one be either a relational contract partisan or a classical or neoclassical
individualistic advocate. These are unnecessary doctrinal barriers to a dispassionate ex-
amination of the problems created by disruptive events. See Goldberg, supra note 10, at
542 ("[Any conclusion [about ALCOA] would be premature-there has been very little
analysis of why and how business firms deal with price adjustment problems. . ..
[W]e will make more progress in understanding the economics of contracts if we do not
insist upon drawing policy conclusions.").
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II. COMPLICATIONS IN THE DOCTRINE OF IMPRACTICABILITY:
METAMORPHOSIS OF A SIMPLE DOCTRINE IN A COMPLEX WORLD
A. Origins: From the Impossible to the Impracticable
The doctrine of excusing performance in consequence of certain
disruptive events 3 arose from the problem presented by the physical,
objective impossibility of contractual performance.3 4 Into contractual si-
lence, courts interpolated a presumed intent35 of the parties to condition
performance of a party's obligations upon the continuing physical via-
bility of that performance. Thus, under the traditional doctrine of phys-
ical impossibility, relief from contractual performance follows from the
twin factual determinations that (1) performance was indeed not possi-
ble,"6 and (2) that the promisor had not expressly assumed the risk of
the event causing the impossibility.' The issue is not one of discovering
" The evolution of the various forms of excuse arising from a presumptively un-
anticipated event not directly within the control of either party has been thoroughly
examined elsewhere. See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 862-68; Schlegel, Of
Nuts, and Ships, and Sealing Wax, Suez, and Frustrating Things-The Doctrine of
Impossibility of Performance, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 419, 419-38 (1969); Sirianni,
supra note 10 at 32-42; Speziale, supra note 15, at 574-82; Stroh, The Failure of the
Doctrine of Impractibility, 5 CORP. L. REV. 195, 196-204 (1982); Wallach, The Ex-
cuse Defense in the Law of Contracts: Judicial Frustration of the U.C.C. Attempt to
Liberalize the Law of Commercial Impracticability, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 203, 204-
07 (1979).
34 The case of Taylor v. Caldwell, decided by the Court of Queens Bench in
1863, is generally considered the source of the doctrine of excuse for physical impossi-
bility. 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863). See, e.g., C. FRIED, supra note 14, at 58 (citing
Taylor as the paradigmatic case linking excuse to physical impossibility). In Taylor,
performers had contracted to rent a music hall, which was destroyed by fire shortly
before their scheduled performance. The court held that the performers were without
remedy against the owner of the destroyed premises. From contractual silence, the court
implied the intention of both parties to condition the owner's performance upon the
continued existence of the structure that was the subject of the contract. Id. at 312.
Thus, the origin of the doctrine of impossibility was rather simple, if not free from
dispute. Taylor was an extension of the long-recognized excuses that had been applied
when performance would directly involve violation of a supervening governmental ac-
tion or when, in the case of personal services to be rendered by the promisor, the prom-
isor died prior to the time for performance, or when the subject matter of the contract
had been destroyed prior to the time for its execution.
35 See C. FRIED, supra note 14, at 60.
31 One might argue that every contract contains alternative performance crite-
ria-literal performance of the obligations or the payment of money damages-so that
there can never truly be impossibility. See Sirianni, supra note 10, at 32-36.
" Thus, the courts have had little difficulty with the crop failure cases: if it can be
found that delivery was to come from the farmer/promisor's crops, failure of that crop
will discharge the promisor. See, e.g., Bunge Corp. v. Recker, 519 F.2d 449, 450-51
(8th Cir. 1975); Bunge Corp. v. Miller, 381 F. Supp. 176, 180 (W.D. Tenn. 1974);
Ralston Purina Co. v. McNabb, 381 F. Supp. 181, 182 (W.D. Tenn. 1974); Semo
Grain Co. v. Oliver Farms, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Mo. App. 1975); see also
Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co:, 799 F.2d 265, 278 (7th Cir.
1987]
1132 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the parties' actual intent or whether or not the disrupting event was
foreseeable. The event, physical impossibility of performance, is not
necessarily unforeseeable; it is simply not dealt with by the parties and
must be dealt with by the law. In short, with respect to physical impos-
sibility of performance, both the historical rationale for the decisions
and the issue of the wisdom 8 and nature of judicial interpolation and
implication have become irrelevant. The fact that the determination to
discharge the affected party arose from the fiction of presumed intent is
merely of historical interest. In the absence of express provision to the
contrary in the contract, performance rendered physically impossible or
illegal by some supervening event not occasioned by the fault of the
promisor is excused.3 9
The clarity attendant to the excuse of physical impossibility might
have provided the basis for extension and refinement of contract doc-
trine to meet the twentieth century's complex commercial needs. Mod-
ern commerce has called for a legal doctrine that deals with perform-
ance rendered effectively, but not physically, impossible. In fact, the
doctrine of commercial impracticability appears to have been born in
1916, in Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard,40 as a simple extension
1986) (discussing general rule in crop failure cases); Whitman v. Anglum, 92 Conn.
392, 103 A. 114 (1918) (provision that buyer was to pick up milk at seller's premises
did not excuse performance when seller's farm was quarantined and his cows killed);
cf Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 879 n.103 ("[Ilt has been suggested that a 'social
judgment' underlies the fact that the farmer whose crop of grain is fortuitously de-
stroyed is more easily excused from his promise to deliver grain than is the dealer
under similar circumstances."). In the crop failure cases involving a farmer-seller, ex-
cuse does not require a determination that, notwithstanding human experience, the fail-
ure of the crop was not foreseeable. Cf Alimenta (USA), Inc. v. Gibbs Nathaniel
(Canada) Ltd., 802 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1986) (Dealer-seller excused, but only after a
finding that the drought causing the failure was not foreseeable).
Similarly, in the case of personal service obligations, the contractual omission with
respect to the death of the promisor is filled with the assumption, or the presumed
intent, that performance by the promisor is conditioned on survival, notwithstanding
the absolute presumption of human mortality that renders death the quintessential fore-
seeable event.
"B One might well have argued, as the law was evolving through the latter part of
the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, that to import the fiction of a presump-
tively intended condition to performance into an otherwise unequivocal undertaking
was unwise and inimical to the apparent sanctity of contract as an expression of the
will of the parties. Conversely, one might just as well have argued that the very for-
ward-looking nature of an executory contract conditioned obligation on the continued
existence of the subject matter. Ultimately, the resolution of this conflict is not impor-
tant today. What is important, however, is that the excuse doctrine did evolve and it is
simply too late in the development of the law of contract to abandon totally the older
and uniformly recognized excuses.
SB See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261-72 (1979) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT] and U.C.C. § 2-613 (essentially codifying the common law with re-
spect to physical impossibility).
40 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916).
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of the existing and straightforward impossibility doctrine. As Judge
Sloss described the connection: "'A thing is impossible in legal contem-
plation when it is not practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it
can only be done at excessive and unreasonable cost.' ",41 With these
few simple words, physical impossibility had become commercial im-
practicability."2 But as commercial transactions became more complex,
so too did the doctrinal extension. Notwithstanding the logic and sim-
plicity of Mineral Park's equation of impossibility with commercial
impracticability, its application has been, at best, idiosyncratic.4 While
Mineral Park still stands as the paradigm for application of the doc-
trine of commercial impracticability," it affords little guidance in the
41 Id. at 293, 156 P. at 460 (quoting I BEACH ON CONTRACTS § 216). In Min-
eral Park, the defendants had agreed to take from the plaintiff's land all the earth and
gravel, approximately 114,000 cubic yards, needed for fill and cement work on a nearby
bridge construction site. The defendants stopped after taking little more than 50,000
cubic yards; the rest of the earth and gravel was underwater and could be removed only
"at an expense of ten or twelve times as much as the usual cost per yard." Id. at 291,
156 P. at 459. The court found that "the contract was entered into without any calcula-
tion on the part of either of the parties with reference to the amount of available earth
and gravel on the premises." Id. The lower court held for the plaintiff, finding that,
while difficult and expensive, removal of the underwater earth and gravel was not "im-
possible." Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court, with what appeared to be a
minor extension of doctrine, excused the defendant. Id. at 293, 156 P. at 459-60 ("[11n
determining whether the earth and gravel were 'available' we must view the conditions
in a practical and reasonable way. . . .To all fair intents then, it was impossible for
defendants to take it. . . .[W]here the difference in cost is so great ...and has the
"effect. . .of making performance impracticable, the situation is not different from that
of a total absence of earth and gravel.").
42 It has been argued that there is and ought to be no legal distinction between the
two doctrines. This simple step from physical impossibility to effective impossibility
deriving from impracticability has been hailed as the expansion and creative use of
impossibility to foster equity and justice. See Speziale, supra note 15, at 569-72. It has
also been argued that "[c]ommon law impossibility, formerly a very harsh doctrine
which purported to require a showing of objective or scientific impossibility, has been
moderated by case law to the point where it is equivalent to impracticability under the
[Uniform Commercial] Code." Westinghouse 1, 517 F. Supp. 440, 451 (E.D. Va.
1981). It would seem to follow that a demonstration by a promisor of impracticability
resulting from a disruptive event not expressly provided for in the contract or by the
clear intendment of the surrounding circumstances should give rise to discharge, and
that such impracticability is demonstrated by a showing that performance can be done
only "at excessive and unreasonable cost." Mineral Park, 172 Cal. at 293, 156 P. at
460 (citation omitted).
"' "[A] study of the cases using percentages, and most do, indicate [sic] that when
prices only double, relief is unavailable. When prices increase tenfold, relief is availa-
ble." Wallach, supra note 33, at 217 (citation omitted). Wallach notes, however, that
the only cases cited as granting relief are Mineral Park, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458, and
City of Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 45 Cal. 2d 710, 290 P.2d 841 (1955). Id. at 217
n.57. See also Speidel, supra note 5, at 267 ("To date we know what degree of loss
will not excuse, but have no idea how 'drastic' a loss will make performance impracti-
cable or how that result should be explained." (footnote omitted)).
"" Unfortunately, it also appears to be the unique case in which the doctrine was
applied as simply as it was stated-as an extension of a rather straightforward existing
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face of both the increasing complexity of contractual relations and the
increasing interdependence of commercial activities that became charac-
teristic of business in the last third of the twentieth century. What be-
gan as a simple gloss on existing doctrine has become increasingly com-
plex, leaving the appearance, if not the reality, of incoherence and a
doctrine that is frequently invoked, but only rarely and erratically
applied.
B. The Quantification of Impracticability
Equating commercial impracticability with physical impossibility
gives rise to a purely quantitative analysis: how great a loss or devia-
tion from the original contracting conditions makes performance im-
practicable? This arithmetic determination is an unavoidable concomi-
tant of a doctrine requiring a finding of excessive or unreasonable cost.
Even within the context of quantification dispute may still arise over
how impracticability should be calculated. One could argue that the
formulation should encompass only the direct performance cost in-
crease-a determination of the scope of the loss on the contract. Alter-
natively, one might settle on a broader formula that considers the dis-
ruptive event in terms of the net impact on the promisor. Such a
polarity is in fact exemplified by ALCOA on one end of the spectrum
and the opinions resolving the litigation between Florida Power and
Light Company and Westinghouse Electric Corporation45 on the other.
In ALCOA, 46 Judge Teitelbaum took a narrow approach to the
quantification issue, basing his $75 million projection of Alcoa's losses
on a determination of the dollar costs of Alcoa's continued perform-
ance,47 rather than Alcoa's overall financial condition or other matters
doctrine.
45Westinghouse II, 597 F. Supp. 1456 (E.D. Va. 1984); Westinghouse I, 517 F.
Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981).
While we cannot escape the current polarity of approaches, it is important to un-
derstand that this divergence in opinion as to what actually constitutes impracticability
need not have been the norm. If the straightforward Mineral Park extension of physi-
cal impossibility had become the basis for judicial thinking about impracticability, we
would now have a body of case law establishing parameters of quantitative impractica-
bility and a set of guidelines more useful than the simple statement that a doubling of
cost is insufficient and a tenfold increase is sufficient. Indeed, the hope had been ex-
pressed that the complex Westinghouse uranium litigation, discussed infra at note 50,
would afford the court a clear opportunity to set new quantification standards. Wal-
lach, supra note 33, at 218. That hope was thwarted by the more prudent course of
settlement.
4' ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
41 Id. at 59. One might question his calculation of the magnitude of the loss,
premised as it was upon the assumption that high oil prices would continue indefi-
nitely. He recognized that he was making a projection on the assumption "that the
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related either to its contract with Essex"' or its position in the alumi-
num industry.49 In contrast, in Westinghouse I and Westinghouse II,
Judge Merhige sought to evaluate the overall economic consequences of
performance. He consistently refused to limit his examination to the
increased expense. Instead, he considered the entire context of the con-
tract and the overall tangible and intangible benefits received by West-
inghouse in reaching his conclusion that the additional performance
cost to Westinghouse of $100 million was not so excessive as to make
performance impracticable.
Westinghouse had sold two complete nuclear generating plants to
Florida Power and Light. In conjunction with the sale, the parties en-
tered into long-term contracts whereby Westinghouse would supply
fuel to the utility5" and remove it when spent. At the inception of the
future economy will be much like the present" and noted that each party "continues to
have recourse to the courts" in the event of "severe and surprising economic develop-
ments." Id. at 66 & n.7. Recent events have shaken that assumption; see, e.g., North-
ern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 278 (7th Cir. 1986)
(one of the recent "buyer" cases, in which excuse is claimed as a result of the serious
decline in fuel prices).
48 Indeed, the apparent windfall to Essex, which made substantial profits by resel-
ling the processed aluminum in the market rather than using it in the manufacture of
aluminum wire as the parties had intended, seemed to concern Judge Teitelbaum as
much as Alcoa's costs. It is at least interesting to speculate how the case might have
been decided had Judge Teitelbaum viewed the contract as a requirements contract
and, under U.C.C. section 2-306(1), limited the quantity to be delivered to Essex to its
actual manufacturing needs, thereby eliminating the windfall.
4' This same approach to quantification was recognized, at least implicitly, a year
later by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Asphalt Int'l, Inc. v. Enterprise
Shipping Corp., 667 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1981). In Asphalt International, the defendant
shipowner refused to repair a vessel chartered to plaintiff after it had been severely
damaged in a collision, notwithstanding defendant's contractual duty to repair. The
plaintiff sued for loss of profits to be derived from the charter. The cost of repair,
$1,500,000, was twice the fair value of the ship. The court found this cost "excessive
and unreasonable," and excused defendant's obligation to repair. The court of appeals
upheld this finding even though the damage was considered a "total" loss and defend-
ant had received insurance proceeds of $1,335,000 in addition to $157,500 as scrap
value. Id. at 263-66. The court stated:
The doctrine of commercial impracticability focuses on the reasonableness
of the expenditure at issue, not upon the ability of a party to pay the
commercially unreasonable expense. The existence of insurance coverage
in excess of the fair market value of the ship bears no relationship to the
controlling issue-the reasonableness of the requested repairs.
Id. at 266 (citations omitted). With respect to the impracticability doctrine the court
applied a standard directed not so much to the cost of performance per se as to whether
such excessive cost "would alter the essential nature of the contract." Id. The court was
also concerned about the role of business loss insurance and its availability to the plain-
tiff in determining whether to allocate the risk of loss to the plaintiff. Id., at 266 n.5;
see also infra notes 174-80 and accompanying text (discussing risk allocation).
90 The efforts of Westinghouse Electric Corporation to take a leadership position
in the development of private nuclear power in the mid-1960's served as the basis for
extensive litigation. As part of an effort to sell nuclear power facilities to utilities,
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contract in 1965, Westinghouse had anticipated that it could reprocess
the fuel, even though no reprocessing plants had been built, at an esti-
mated profit of from $16 million to $19 million. Without the opportu-
nity to reprocess the fuel, however, removal itself was a considerable
financial burden. 5' Ten years into the contract commercial reprocessing
remained infeasible and there existed neither reprocessing facilities nor
off-site storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel. As a result, Westing-
house advised that it would not remove the fuel.
Florida Power and Light countered by instituting suit.52 The util-
ity sought to hold Westinghouse responsible for the approximately
$100 million cost to the utility for interim on-site spent fuel storage and
ultimate removal to permanent government-operated disposal sites
scheduled to be operative no sooner than 1998."3 In its defense, West-
inghouse claimed that the unavailability of reprocessing for spent fuel
and the lack of disposal sites served to excuse the nonperformance of its
contractual obligation to remove the spent fuel, on grounds of impracti-
cability, impossibility, frustration of purpose, and mutual mistake.54
The court found that the projected losses of $100 million were not
Westinghouse entered into long-term contracts to provide, at a fixed price, approxi-
mately 70 million pounds of uranium to be used in the facilities. The company had not
arranged matching contracts to procure the uranium and, by 1975, with significant
increases in the world market price for uranium, Westinghouse announced that it faced
losses of $2 billion on its contracts and that it would not perform. It grounded its
refusal on the commercial impracticability doctrine found in U.C.C. section 2-615. In
response to this announcement, twenty-seven utilities brought fourteen separate actions
against Westinghouse. See Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market
and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119 (1977) for a comprehensive discus-
sion of the litigation and its context. The consolidated litigation, In re Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litig., 405 F. Supp. 316 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975), was set-
tled without a published decision on the merits, although it appears that, notwithstand-
ing the magnitude of its losses, Westinghouse's action in entering into fixed-price con-
tracts at a time of great uncertainty as to the future behavior of the uranium market
would have precluded relief on the basis of the foreseeability of market volatility. See
Dawson, supra note 10, at 25-26 (stating that the trial judge concluded that Westing-
house had no sufficient excuse to escape liability).
51 Westinghouse I, 517 F. Supp. at 446-47.
Id. at 443. In 1977, as a result of widespread concern over the consequences of
private availability of plutonium and other by-products of reprocessing, President
Carter issued an Executive Order prohibiting reprocessing. This order was rescinded
by President Reagan in 1981. Id. at 447, 449. See Westinghouse II, 597 F. Supp. at
1460-61.
11 Pending removal of the fuel, the utility built temporary storage pits at a cost in
excess of $9 million. See Westinghouse I, 517 F. Supp. at 448. When 1983 legislation
authorized the Department of Energy to construct permanent disposal sites, however,
the utility contracted with the Department for permanent disposal at a cost of $70
million. The cost of further on-site storage to the utility until the scheduled 1998 opera-
tive date of the disposal site was estimated at $12 million. See Westinghouse II, 597 F.
Supp. at 1459-61.
Westinghouse I, 517 F. Supp. at 450.
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so excessive as to make performance impracticable. While recognizing
that the substantial cost of removal without the anticipated gain from
reprocessing "might be sufficient to constitute impracticability in an-
other context,"55 the court found that Westinghouse had not shown a
loss on the entire contract. 56 The court reached this conclusion by tak-
ing an expansive view of the quantification issue: "[I]mpracticability by
reason of additional expense is not to be determined by reference to the
loss, or failure to profit, from one particular contract term in isolation.
Rather, it is to be judged from the perspective of the entire
undertaking."57
Intuitively, Judge Merhige's holistic approach to cost is appeal-
ing.58 Quantification predicated on the entire transactional context and
all of the consequences of performance seems particularly consistent
with fairness. Nevertheless, such a consequential inquiry raises serious
obstacles to consistency in the application of doctrine. The search for
boundaries for the quantification of impracticability is impeded by ad
hoc determinations of costs and benefits beyond those directly attributa-
ble to performance. Such an undertaking would not only entail enor-
mous process costs in litigation but also would limit the effect of each
case and decision to its peculiar facts.
Although a holistic approach aids in the ultimate determination of
what is "fair" or commercially reasonable, it is not appropriate if the
issue is the purely quantitative one of evaluating projected losses from
performance. Indeed, the limited judicial focus in ALCOA59 seems nec-
essary if we are to achieve something more than ad hoc jurisprudence.
Unfortunately, there has been too little express judicial discussion of
this issue and the capability of the courts to deal with it. The compet-
ing viewpoints are only rarely forthrightly presented."0 More direct dis-
55 Id. at 454.
51 Id. at 453.
57 Id. (citations omitted). Considering only the tangible benefits stemming from
Westinghouse's contracts, Judge Merhige found that imposing the $100 million dispo-
sal and storage obligation on Westinghouse would not result in an unacceptable loss.
Indeed, its losses would be "just under 50% of total contract revenues." Westinghouse
II, 597 F. Supp. at 1477.
" Indeed, this approach has been adopted by at least one other court. See Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., 517 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 (E.D.
La. 1981) (holding defendant's expected loss of $428,500 on one particular contract due
to price increases did not make performance commercially impracticable in light of the
overall profitability of defendant's plant).
59 Again, the approach in Asphalt International, 667 F.2d 261, is similar. See
supra note 49.
60 The Westinghouse cases, see supra text accompanying notes 55-57, and
Asphalt International, see supra note 49, are rare examples of clear exposition of the
competing views.
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cussion in a variety of cases is needed before one can comfortably point
to an optimum set of boundaries for quantifying impracticability. For
now, any application of a quantitative test to determine how much cost
renders performance impracticable must be narrow in scope if coherent
doctrine and concomitant rational planning is to emerge.
More broadly, the entire notion of a quantitative, formulaic ap-
proach, whether narrowly or broadly applied, has been criticized as
unrealistic and inappropriate.6" Nevertheless, a formidable line of cases
has followed the litany of quantification, finding that increased cost
alone, and particularly cost due to market fluctuations, will not provide
the basis for relief without a finding that such costs are "excessive" or
extraordinarily high. 2 The quantification of impracticability is merely
one step in the judicial determination of excuse. Although, as Judge
Merhige observed, what is "excessive" in one context may be accept-
able in another,"3 so long as the issue of "how much" is considered in
isolation, the numbers game seems inevitable.
If, however, one abandons the bifurcation of impracticability into
elements of quantifiable loss and foreseeability, one can develop a qual-
itative analysis predicated upon "how different" instead of "how much"
is performance that can serve as an integrating factor in resolving the
excuse dispute.64 Examining how the quality of contractual perform-
"1 See Speidel, supra note 5, at 267 ("The cases have been preoccupied with the
arithmetic of loss . . . ."); see generally Note, U.C.C. § 2-615: Excusing the Imprac-
ticable, 60 B.U.L. REv. 575 (1980) (arguing that courts should engage in a mul-
tifaceted examination of the parties' risk assumptions instead of simply couching find-
ings as to the sufficiency of various cost increases in conclusory language).
62 See, e.g., Bernina Distrib. Inc. v. Bernina Sewing Mach. Co., 646 F.2d 434,
439-40 (10th Cir. 1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 563 F.2d 588,
599-600 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978); American Trading &
Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l Marine Ltd., 453 F.2d 939, 942 (2d Cir. 1972); Transatlan-
tic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 (E.D. La.
1981); In re North Broadway Funding Corp., 6 Bankr. 133, 135 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1980); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 132-33 (N.D.
Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 911 (1980); Hancock Paper Co. v. Champion Int'l Corp., 424 F. Supp. 285, 290-
91 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd, 565 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1977); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 440-41 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Publicker Indus. Inc. v.
Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 989, 991 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Swift Textiles, Inc. v. Lawson, 135 Ga. App. 799, 805, 219 S.E.2d 167, 171 (1975);
Nora Springs Coop. Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 1976); Missouri
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721, 728 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979); Helms Constr. & Dev. Co. v. State, 97 Nev. 500, 503, 634
P.2d 1224, 1225 (1981); Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist. of Elmira, 76 Misc.
2d 1080, 1085-86, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784, 790 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
63 Westinghouse I, 517 F. Supp. at 454.
, See Speidel, supra note 5, at 266 ("[Tlhe emphasis should be on the degree to
which performance has been made different, rather than upon the degree of financial
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ance is altered by the supervening event can free the inquiry from the
artificiality of measuring what is an "excessive" cost by multiples of
contract revenues or other data that are divorced from the relationship
of the parties. This can be accomplished without broadening the
boundaries of economic analysis.6 5
Such a qualitative approach is hinted at in Asphalt International,
Inc. v. Enterprise Shipping Corp.6 The court tried to determine
whether, under the circumstances, performance would be "essentially
different from that for which [the parties] contracted. . . . [or whether
the event] . . . alter[ed] the essential nature of the contract."' 67 It was
this emphasis on the question of the change in "the essential nature" of
contractual performance, rather than the magnitude of hardship or is-
sues of foreseeability, that underlay recognition of the excuse in the
1985 decision in International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Llano,
Inc.
68
An integrated and qualitatively based doctrine of impracticability
can be developed as we assimilate enough litigation to produce a foun-
hardship suffered.").
65 "The rationale for the defense of commercial impracticability is that the cir-
cumstance causing the breach has rendered performance 'so vitally different from what
was anticipated that the contract cannot be reasonably [sic] thought to govern.'" Wald-
inger Corp. v. CRS Group Eng'rs, Inc., 775 F.2d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 991 (5th Cir.
1976)); see also Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., 517 F.
Supp. 1319, 1323-24 (E.D. La. 1981); U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 4 (1978) ("Increased
cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due to some unforeseen
contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance.").
68 667 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1981). See supra note 49.
617 Asphalt Int'l, 667 F.2d at 266 (citation omitted).
" 770 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1196 (1986). Plaintiff,
the operator of a potash mine, had entered into a ten-year contract to buy natural gas
from defendant. The contract contained industry-standard "take or pay" provisions:
plaintiff was obligated to pay for an established minimum usage, whether or not it
actually took that amount of gas, with such minimum being subject to downward ad-
justment if plaintiff was "unable" to take the minimum. Id. at 881-82. To comply with
proposed, and ultimately enacted, state pollution control regulations, plaintiff radically
changed its processing procedures. Consequently, plaintiff's need for natural gas was
cut in half. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment relieving it of its minimum "take or
pay" obligation by an amount attributable to unneeded gas-approximately $3.5 mil-
lion. Id. at 881. The court of appeals, reversing a judgment for defendant, found that
plaintiff was effectively "unable" to take the gas and, therefore, could avail itself of the
adjustment provisions, because of the nature of the alteration of its performance obliga-
tion. Id. at 887. The court did not attempt to determine if the costs involved were
"excessive." Instead, it seems to have decided on the basis of the significant "difference"
in the nature of performance attributable to the changed circumstances. Indeed, the
plaintiff "was unable, for reasons beyond its reasonable control, to receive its minimum
purchase obligation . . . ." Id. Given the court's approach, it appears likely that relief
would have been afforded even if no provision existed for adjustment in the event of
"inability" to take.
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dation. As experience and the accommodation to environmental changes
enable us to characterize the nature of the disrupted performance in
terms of conceptual, rather than monetary or percentage, boundaries,
we will be able to focus on how performance is changed rather than by
how much.
C. The Centrality of Intent
1. Objectified Intent: "Foreseeability"
The primary issue involved in constructing a complete doctrine of
excuse is the allocation of the risk of the consequences of a serious dis-
ruptive event in the context of contractual silence. The most obvious
resolution to the risk allocation question is a demonstration of the ac-
tual intent of the parties to use contractual silence to allocate the risk to
one of them.69 However, it is unlikely that it would be generally possi-
ble directly, or even circumstantially, to demonstrate the actual intent of
contracting parties regarding contractual silence. If intent is to be the
relevant consideration in allocating risk, it will have to be constructed
by the use of one or more contractual fictions. Courts did exactly this
when developing the excuse of physical impossibility. While espousing
the need for a doctrine of excuse predicated on the mutual intent of the
parties, the courts replaced a finding of actual intent with the fiction of
a presumed intent to condition performance.
In time, doctrine itself served to allocate the risk of physical im-
possibility without reference to its implicit fiction. In expanding excuse
to commercial impracticability the implicit fiction of presumed intent
was useless. If excuse required a predicate of intent, some other more
explicit indication of intent was needed. This need to base doctrine on
intent led the courts to focus on the fiction of foreseeability; what has
resulted is a doctrine of commercial impracticability that combines the
quantification of impracticability with the judicially imposed standard
of foreseeability 70 as a mirror of intent. It is these two themes-the
" But see Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 617, 636 (1983) (suggesting that "the prospect of severe harm" may
justify some risk-sharing "[e]ven when risk allocation is clear .... ).
7' The ambiguity here is deliberate: the question may be the foreseeability of the
event itself or the foreseeability of the consequences flowing from the event.
A compromise is struck . . . when abnormal risks are foreseen at the time
of contracting, but the occurrence of the particular event or its magnitude
is unanticipated. Rather than holding that the failure to provide explicitly
means that the seller assumed the risks, a few decisions suggest that the
seller should be held to a stricter standard in establishing that performance
"as agreed" is impracticable. Although the opinions are frequently mud-
dled, the compromise shows some sensitivity to the reality of uncertainty.
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foreseeability of the disruptive event and the magnitude of the
loss-that dominate the great bulk of judicial opinion with respect to
the impact of disruptive events upon performance obligations in the ab-
sence of express contractual allocation of risk. Indeed, these two themes
are better seen as components of the overall theme of the search for
indicia of intent, as resolution of each appears to depend upon resolu-
tion of the other. 1
Initially, the concept of foreseeability was imported only as a fac-
tor in the ultimate determination of whether an excuse from perform-
ance was justified. For example, the issue in American Trading &
Products Corp. v. Shell International Marine Ltd. 2 was whether the
closing of the Suez Canal, prompted by the upheavals in the Middle
East, excused performance under shipping and charter agreements
which had become more expensive with the unavailability of the Canal
route.73 The two principal cases in the United States, consistently with
the English decisions, denied relief to the promisor. 4 For these courts,
which attempted to balance the factors involved, 5 the determinant was
the magnitude of the loss; the losses were simply not so great as to
Speidel, supra note 5, at 262-63 (citations omitted). See, e.g., ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at
67-70; Westinghouse II, 597 F. Supp. at 1474-75. But see Stroh, supra note 33, at 215
("Foreseeability, as an approach to solving the problem of impracticability, focuses en-
tirely on the question of the occurrence of the event which caused the impracticality. It
does not admit of consideration of the effect of the occurrence of the event even if it had
been foreseen.").
71 See infra notes 101-24 and accompanying text (discussing the judiciary's inte-
grated and recursive use of the factors of foreseeability and magnitude of loss when
addressing the impracticability issue). As one commentator notes:
The cases . . . have suggested that sellers who have accepted some "ab-
normal risk," without assuming the risk that the contingency will occur,
may have to prove an even greater loss to be excused ...
[I]n fact, the courts appear to be using the amount of financial
loss as a factor in deciding whether the parties assumed that the contin-
gency would occur.
Speidel, supra note 5, at 267-68.
72 453 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1972).
73 See id. at 940-41. This same issue was addressed in Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v.
United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The Suez litigation, in Great Brit-
ain and in the United States, has been the subject of extensive and thorough commen-
tary. See, e.g., Birmingham, supra note 26; Schlegel, supra note 33, at 429-38;
Berman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Practices in Interna-
tional Trade, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1420-27 (1963); see also Trakman, supra
note 10, at 476 n.16.
74 See American Trading, 453 F.2d at 942; Transatlantic Fin., 363 F.2d at 319-
20. An earlier American case, Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 275 F.2d 253, 257
(2d Cir. 1960), found risk allocation from the parties' negotiations; see also Farns-
worth, supra note 14, at 888.
71 Transatlantic Fin., 363 F.2d at 315 ("[T]he community's interest in having
contracts enforced . . . is outweighed by the commercial senselessness of requiring per-
formance." (citation omitted)).
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render performance "impracticable.""6 The courts here did not depart
significantly from the simpler equation of Mineral Park: they could not
find that the amounts involved served to make performance functionally
"impossible" and therefore it was not "commercially impracticable" in
the excusing sense. The question of the foreseeability of the Canal clos-
ing was viewed as a factor, but not necessarily the determinative factor,
in reaching a decision whether the parties had inferentially allocated
the risk attendant to such closing.77
As the context shifted to the more complex problems presented by
nuclear technology and long-term contractual relationships, the balanc-
ing evident in the Suez Canal cases-the emphasis upon a demonstra-
tion of impracticability in fact as an approximation of impossibil-
ity-also changed and the primacy of the foreseeability indication of
intent seemed to be established.7" A 1985 decision79 demonstrates the
now central importance of foreseeability:
Because the purpose of a contract is to place the reasonable
risk of performance upon ,the promisor. . . it is presumed to
have agreed to bear any loss occasioned by an event that was
foreseeable at the time of contracting.
The applicability of the defense of commercial impracti-
cability, then, turns largely on foreseeability. The relevant
inquiry is whether the risk of the occurrence of the contin-
gency was so unusual or unforeseen and the consequences of
7 The "losses" involved the extra cost entailed in using the alternative of the
Cape of Good Hope. The availability (the contract did not limit performance to the
Suez Canal route), if not the desirability, of that alternative precluded a finding of
"impracticability" unless the cost of the alternative was of such magnitude as to render
it the economic equivalent of impossibility. See American Trading, 453 F.2d at 942
("There is no extreme or unreasonable difficulty apparent here. The alternate route
taken was well recognized. And there is no claim that the vessel or the crew or the
nature of the cargo made the route actually taken unreasonably difficult, dangerous or
onerous."); Transatlantic Fin., 363 F.2d at 318-20 (finding that the promisor was
both able and in the best position to provide for the contingency of the Canal closing).
7 As one court explained:
Foreseeability or even recognition of a risk does not necessarily prove its
allocation. Parties to a contract are not always able to provide for all the
possibilities of which they are aware, sometimes because they cannot
agree, often simply because they are too busy. Moreover, that some abnor-
mal risk was contemplated is probative but does not necessarily establish
an allocation of the risk of the contingency which actually occurs.
Transatlantic Fin., 363 F.2d at 318 (citation omitted).
78 See Stroh, supra note 33, at 213-16 (discussing the centrality of foreseeability
in the decisions); Comment, The Role of Foreseeability in Allocation of Risk Under
UCC 2-615, Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions, 21 S. TEx. L.J. 441
(1981).
" Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group Eng'rs, Inc., 775 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1985).
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the occurrence of the contingency so severe that to require
performance is to grant the buyer an advantage he did not
bargain for in the contract. °
Although the court in passing asks whether the occurrence was "un-
foreseen," it quickly shifts from that subjective, factual inquiry, to the
objective inquiry of whether it was "unforeseeable."" l The centrality of
intent, particularly the judicial focus on foreseeability in impracticabil-
ity doctrine, has produced scholarly and some judicial concern and dis-
satisfaction. It is argued that the consequence of the foreseeability test
has been a highly restrictive attitude toward the impracticability ex-
cuse,"2 thus hindering what is believed to be the necessary expansion of
the doctrine of impracticability to meet modern commercial necessity.
8 3
80 Id., at 786 (citations omitted). The court continued:
If the risk of the occurrence of the contingency was unforeseeable, the
seller cannot be said to have assumed that risk. If the risk . . . was fore-
seeable, that risk is tacitly assigned to the seller. . . .[Ilf a contingency is
foreseeable, the [impracticability] defense is unavailable because the party
disadvantaged by the fruition of the contingency might have contractually
protected itself.
Id.
81 The courts' bypassing of a subjective inquiry in favor of an objective one is
discussed in greater detail below. See infra notes 101-24 and accompanying text.
82 See, e.g., Trakman, supra note 10, at 477 ("Although frequently discussed by
judges, these imaginative rationales have usually not induced courts to grant excuses
from performance."). As one commentator notes:
In general, there is grudging judicial agreement with the proposition...
that a seller may be excused from performance of his obligation by the
occasion of a fortuitous event which renders his contemplated performance
physically impossible by destruction of the specific thing which was the
subject of the contract. Once, however, an attempt is made to expand the
scope of this judicial agreement . . . that agreement is not altogether'clear.
Stroh, supra note 33, at 210 (footnotes omitted).
83 One commentator claims: "The problem with 'foreseeability' is not so much
that it asks the wrong questions, which it does; it lies in the fact that, with respect to
most contracts, it provides the right answer even though asking the wrong question
because it ignores the 'how' and 'why' businessmen contract." Stroh, supra note 33, at
216. See Sirianni, supra note 10, at 57 ("[T]he foreseeability inquiry can shed very
little light on the intentions of the parties. This is because of its inevitable ambiguity
and lack of relation to the way contracts are actually made."); Wallach, supra note 33,
at 214-15 (arguing that foreseeability is a less than perfect basis for determining
whether risk allocation has occurred). Another commentator adds:
The unusual quality of the frustrating event may be combined with as-
sumption of risk in the sometimes articulated supposition that the risk of a
known contingency, however unusual, is more likely to have been allo-
cated by agreement than an unknown or unexpected event. Elevating this
assumption to a requirement for frustration, however, is an unwarranted
concession to a questionable need for legal certainty.
Schlegel, supra note 33, at 441 (footnote omitted). See also, Hawkland, supra note 5,
at 80 (quoting the English case of Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp. v. V/O Sovfracht,
[1964] 2 Q.B. 226 (C.A. 1963), which emphasizes that just because a risk is foreseen
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The objective search for intent fails, it is urged, because the foreseeabil-
ity of a contingency is not necessarily determinative of intent: there are
myriad reasons why parties may choose to remain silent and it is un-
realistic to presume that, if an event is foreseeable, silence is equivalent
to an intention to leave the risk with the promisor.8 4 Certainly, as has
been suggested, the foreseeability principle "has a curious ring of sev-
enteenth-century literalism; it is based on the ill-conceived premise that
a party can be expected to deal in appropriate language with all situa-
tions he can foresee." 5 Ultimately, these commentators lament the
anomalous result that "the commercial impracticability doctrine is rec-
ognized, but rarely allowed as an excuse." 6
yet not dealt with in a contract, does not necessarily mean that one of the parties should
be prevented from using a defense based on frustration of contract); Hurst, Freedom of
Contract in an Unstable Economy: Judicial Reallocation of Contractual Risks Under
UCC Section 2-615, 54 N.C.L. REV. 545, 567-70 (1976) (discussing the manner in
which courts have used the factor of foreseeability when applying the impracticability
doctrine); Tannenbaum, Commercial Impracticability Under the Uniform Commercial
Code: Natural Gas Distributors' Vehicle for Excusing Long-Term Requirements Con-
tracts?, 20 Hous. L. REV. 771, 785-91 (1983) (commenting on the roles that risk
allocation in general and foreseeability in particular play in U.C.C. § 2-615); Com-
ment, Contractual Excuse Based on a Failure of Presupposed Conditions, 14 DuQ. L.
REV. 235, 237-38, 244-51 (1976) (discussing the role of foreseeability with regard to
both U.C.C. § 2-615 and the case law).
' Professor Farnsworth has commented that "the principle of foreseeability has
no merit as a general rule and should be discarded." Farnsworth, supra note 14, at
887; see also Gillette, supra note 24; Hillman, supra note 69, at 625 ("To some extent
all commercial contingencies are foreseeable. The question is better put in terms of how
foreseeable the occurrence was. Determining the extent of foreseeability, however, ne-
cessitates difficult line-drawing, and other unrelated factors often can control the deter-
mination."); Sirianni, supra note 10, at 65 ("To foresee a risk is not to allocate it.");
Wallach, supra note 33, at 214-15 ("Even foreseeable contingencies may not have been
allocated because of an inability to agree on the allocation, or because the parties were
too pressed for time to consider it.").
85 Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 885 (footnote omitted); see id. at 871 ("Fate may
outstrip even the most sybilline draftsman, with a probability that increases with the
life of the contract.").
88 McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765, 775 (W. Va. 1984) (Harshbarger, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted). Indeed, ALCOA is cited as the exceptional case granting
relief. Id. The few recent cases have granted relief while simply ignoring ALCOA. See
International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1196 (1986); Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group Eng'rs, Inc., 775
F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1985). One is inevitably left with the impression that:
Excuse [for impracticability] is a game with a predictable outcome-the
buyer wins. The courts consistently have found that the occurrence of the
contingency was assumed or that the occurrence failed to make perform-
ance "as agreed" impracticable. . . .The results. . . are compatible with
some traditional views about the nature and purpose of contract law,
namely, that an "objective" theory of contracts which tightly controls both
the creation of contract liability and the grounds for excuse through stan-
dards of reasonableness is desirable. When this is combined with the natu-
ral tendency to leave the loss on the maker of an unconditional promise,
the results are not surprising.
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I would argue, however, that the reluctance to treat commercial
impracticability with the doctrinal simplicity accorded its impossibility
forebear is consistent with the development of judicial sophistication
and with the complexity of commercial reality. The cases that have
truly served to test the doctrine of impracticability have arisen only
within the past twenty years. The courts have attempted to make sensi-
ble application of the doctrine to a confused and complex commercial
world in which contractual relations were formed in a context, if not of
war, then of the rumors of war, embargo, shortages, and inflation. The
Suez Canal closings,8 7 the uncertainty surrounding the growth and de-
velopment of private nuclear power in the late 1960's and early
1970's,88 the sharp increase in fuel costs because of the OPEC embargo
in the 1970's89 and the recent sharp decline in these costs,"0 have pro-
vided the dramatic setting for the troubled and, to many, troubling, ju-
dicial treatment of impracticability. As Judge Mulligan observed in
American Trading:91 "Matters involving impossibility or impractica-
bility of performance . . .are concededly vexing and difficult. One is
even urged on the allocation of such risks to pray for the 'wisdom of
Solomon' [and decision is based on] the facts, the pertinent authority
and a . . .belief in the efficacy of prayer."92 While we assimilate our
experiences in an effort to form a more coherent doctrine, the unrealis-
tic allocation tool of foreseeability, if applied with care and sophistica-
tion, may be more useful in aiding allocation decisions and balancing
the competing considerations of predictability and fairness than our
presently available alternatives.
Speidel, supra note 5, at 271-72 (footnotes omitted). See Stroh, supra note 33, at 210-
13 (examining the extent of the judiciary's failure to grant relief to sellers based on the
impracticability doctrine).
87 See, e.g., American Trading, 453 F.2d 939; Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United
States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 275 F.2d
253 (2d Cir. 1960).
88 See, e.g., Westinghouse II, 597 F. Supp. 1456; Westinghouse 1, 517 F. Supp.
440; Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 137 (N.D. Iowa
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979); In re Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litig., 405 F. Supp. 316 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975).
8 See, e.g., ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. 53; Eastern Air Lines v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415
F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 989 (E.D. Pa. 1975); see also Louisiana Power &
Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., 517 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. La. 1981).
90 See, e.g., Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d
265 (7th Cir. 1986); International Minerals, 770 F.2d 879; Sharon Steel Corp. v.
Jewell Coal & Coke Co., 735 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1984).
91 453 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1972).
92 Id. at 944 (citation omitted); see 6 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRAcrs
§ 1333, at 371-72 (1962) ("Where neither custom nor agreement determines the allo-
cation of a risk, the court must exercise its equity powers and pray for the wisdom of
Solomon.").
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2. The Code
Although the search for the actual intent of the parties to allocate
risks of disruptive events seems unlikely to yield a generally applicable
test, the Uniform Commercial Code93 posits just such a subjective ap-
proach.94 Commercial impracticability is codified, with respect to the
sale of goods, in section 2-615 of the Code:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater
obligation . ..
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part
. . .is not a breach of. . .duty under a contract for sale if
performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the
occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was
a basic assumption on which the contract was made . . .9
The Code requires that the non-occurrence of the disruptive event be a
"basic assumption" shared by the parties. The "basic assumption" test
has been seen as a departure from the fiction of imputed or presumed
intent and as a way to set the doctrine of impracticability apart from
.the more general rules of contract interpretation or its "impossibility"
antecedent.96 As such, the Code inquiry represents a shift from an ob-
93 U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978). The same type of test is set out in section 261 of the
Restatement, which takes its language from the Code. RESTATEMENT, supra note 39,
§ 261 comment d. The traditional "impossibility" situations are covered in Restate-
ment §§ 262-264.
" In fact, judicial insistence on the mechanism of objective foreseeability as the
indicator of a presumed intent has also been seen as a refusal to adapt to the specific
language of the Uniform Commercial Code. See infra note 105.
" U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (1978). The form of the codification itself is not substan-
tially different from that set out in Mineral Park and has been called a "new synthesis
...[that] candidly recognizes that the judicial function is to determine whether, in the
light of exceptional circumstances, justice requires a departure from the general rule
that a promisor bears the risk of increased difficulty of performance." E. FARNS-
WORTH, CONTRACTS, 677-78 (1982).
By its terms, section 2-615 creates the defense of impracticability only for the
seller and question has been raised whether a buyer, may avail itself of the defense. See
Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 277 (7th Cir.
1986) ("Rarely is it impracticable or impossible for the payor to pay; but if something
has happened to make the performance for which he would be paying worthless to him,
an excuse for not paying, analogous to impracticability or impossibility, may be
proper."); International Minerals, 770 F.2d 879 (granting to I.M.C., the buyer, the
defense of impracticability of fulfillment of its contractual obligation); Nora Springs
Coop. Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 1976) ("While [Iowa's version of
the U.C.C.] expressly mentions sellers, the explanations . . . make it evident the provi-
sions should also be equally applicable to buyers.").
See infra note 165.
8 See, e.g., Black, supra note 11, at 249 ("[T]he term 'impractical' was intended
to loosen the rigidity of the common law requirement of impossibility of perform-
ance."); Schmitt & Wollschlager, Section 2-615 "Commercial Impracticability": Mak-
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jective inquiry into what might "reasonably" have been intended by the
parties, to an apparently subjective search for the shared basic assump-
tion. The Code's shift, at least theoretically, also results in the "aban-
donment of old fictions."'97 The concept of "foreseeability" would give
way to a new behavioral analysis with the inquiry focused on what the
parties actually contemplated.9 In this context, foreseeability is a help-
ful, but not a decisive, indicator of the "basic assumption."99
Using the Code formulation, "excuse" of a promisor who is not
somehow at fault with respect to the occurrence of the disruptive event
theoretically requires independent determinations that the event has
rendered performance "impracticable;" that nonoccurrence of the event
was a "basic assumption on which the contract was made;" and that
risk of the occurrence was not allocated to the promisor by the terms of
the agreement or by the fair intendment of the surrounding circum-
ing the Impracticable Practicable, 81 CoM. L.J. 9, 9 (1976) (Section 2-615 provides
"needed protective flexibility and basic stability .... "); Wallach, supra note 33, at
229 (The UCC was intended "to liberalize the availability of commercial impracticabil-
ity as a contract defense . . ").
11 Jacobs, Legal Realism or Legal Fiction? Impracticability Under the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, 87 COM. L.J. 289, 291-92 (1982) ("[Ilntroduction of basic
assumption language replaces an inflexible objective test with a new subjective inquiry
into the rationale of the parties."). As one commentator states:
[Implication] masks the real issues by encouraging courts to rationalize
their treatment of casus omissi by means of a fictitious intention. [E]ven
where there are expectations, it distorts them by casting them in the form
of contract terms. . . . The implied term may once have been a useful
fiction, but it has served its purpose and should be discarded in favor of a
more realistic analysis.
Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 867-68.
1s See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 4 (1978) ("Increased cost alone does not
excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which
alters the essential nature of the performance."); see also Comment, Contractual Flexi-
bility in a Volatile Economy: Saving U.C.C. Section 2-615from the Common Law, 72
Nw. U.L. REV. 1032, 1040 (1978) (suggesting that there are a multitude of reasons for
parties' behavior in providing or not providing for all contractual contingencies).
9 The Restatement directs that:
In making [the "basic assumption"] determinations, a court will look at all
circumstances, including the terms of the contract. The fact that the event
was unforeseeable is significant as suggesting that its non-occurrence was
a basic assumption. However, the fact that it was foreseeable, or even
foreseen, does not, of itself, argue for a contrary conclusion, since the par-
ties may not have thought it sufficiently important a risk to have made it a
subject of their bargaining.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 39, ch. 11, at 311 (introductory note). See Farnsworth,
supra note 14, at 868-71; cf id. at 882-83 (commenting that the language in the 1946
version of the Restatement worked such that: "In the hard cases, in which it is not clear
whether the parties simply had no expectation with respect to the situation, or had one
but did not express it, it is a sterile exercise for a court to attempt to determine whether
the assumption that the situation would not arise 'forms the basis' of the agreement.").
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stances. 00 "Impracticability" must be quantified independently-how
serious is the disruption? Concurrently, a subjective or objective test of
"foreseeability" resolves the question of the "basic assumption" and the
circumstantial allocation of risk.
Notwithstanding the Code's language, and to the chagrin of those
who saw the Code's approach as a departure from the common law, the
Code's apparently subjective search for actual intent has not in fact
displaced the centrality of objective foreseeability.' 0 ' Judge Merhige
makes abundantly clear in Westinghouse PO2 and Westinghouse 1I,1°3
with support from cases dealing with the matter, 0 that the determina-
tion whether the non-occurrence of a particular disruptive event was a
basic assumption of the parties depends not upon a factual finding of
what the parties assumed but upon a judicial determination of whether
the event was "foreseeable." The issue, then, is not whether the disrup-
tion was foreseen, but whether it might reasonably have been foreseen
under the circumstances." 5 Further, instead of independently quanti-
100 U.C.C § 2-615 (1978); E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 95, at 678.
101 See Black, supra note 11, at 249-50 ("The inescapable impression gained from
reading cases construing section 2-615 . . . is that the courts have not fulfilled the
expectations of the Code drafters, but have tended instead to retain the rigidity of the
pre-Code law."). Commentators have noted that:
[T]he cases . . . show not only a strong judicial resistance to a liberal
adaptation of the section into sales contract law, but also that as §2-615 is
applied to each new problem area, the courts, by following restrictive
precedents, are judicially legislating the Code section to equate with com-
mon law contract principles.
Schmitt & Wollschlager, supra note 96, at 13; Wallach, supra note 33, at 203 ("[T]he
courts have adhered to the common law standards for excuse and have ignored the
[UCC] draftsmen's intent to liberalize those standards."); id. at 207 ("In general, there
has been a tradition of judicial hostility to the [frustration and impracticability] catego-
ries of excuse."). It has been observed that:
[Although § 2-615 is supposed to provide a] 'flexible adjustment machin-
ery' . . . to have the community's interest in enforcing contracts according
to their terms balanced against the commercial senselessness of requiring
performance . . . the potential usefulness . . . is threatened by confusion
[growing out of] a stubborn reluctance to strike two common law concepts
from the methodology of section 2-615: the impossibility doctrine and its
handmaiden, the foreseeability test.
Comment, supra note 98, at 1032-33.
102 517 F. Supp. 440.
103 597 F. Supp. 1456.
104 See Westinghouse I, 517 F. Supp. at 454-55; see also Sirianni, supra note 10,
at 55-65; Stroh, supra note 33, at 213-16 (describing the case law in the area).
'15 Judicial insistence on the mechanism of objective foreseeability as the indicator
of a presumed intent has in fact been seen as a conscious refusal to adapt to the specific
language of the Uniform Commercial Code. See Black, supra note 11, at 248-51;
Schmitt & Wollschlager, supra note 96, at 13; Wallach, supra note 33, at 229; Com-
ment, supra note 98, at 1033; Note, UCC § 2-615: Defining Impracticability Due to
Increased Expense, 32 U. FLA. L. REv. 516, 534-35 (1980).
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fying impracticability and then applying the foreseeability test, the
courts apply the criteria recursively, in a kind of judicial infinite regres-
sion, to allocate risk. Again, Judge Merhige in Westinghouse I is par-
ticularly instructive as he candidly recognized the interdependence of
these apparently separate factors while keeping sight of the fact that the
inquiry is directed toward the overall question of risk allocation.1 6
To Judge Merhige, the issue of impracticability under section 2-
615 of the Code and the cases involved four interrelated questions:
(1) Was performance as agreed rendered impracticable? (2)
Did the claimed impracticability arise from an unforeseen
contingency? (3) Was the non-occurrence of the contingency
a basic assumption on which the contract was made? (4) Did
the parties, explicitly or implicitly, allocate the risk that the
contingency would occur?
It is further to be noted that the issues . . . are interre-
lated: the "answer" to each depends in part on the "an-
swers" to the other three.
1 07
Judge Merhige's serious doubt that the cost of performance was so ex-
cessive as to amount to "impracticability"10 8 fortified him as he consid-
ered the question of foreseeability. Summarizing the general tenor of
authority, he noted:
[W]here the contingency may reasonably be said to have
been foreseeable, courts have generally taken the view that
the promisor should not be released from his obligation. This
rule is based on the notion that where the parties can reason-
ably anticipate events that may affect performance, the pru-
dent course is to provide for such eventualities in their
106 Such allocation is to be "determined by the totality of the circumstances, in-
cluding the comparative abilities of the parties to make informed judgments as to the
extent of the risk; each party's interest in avoiding the risk; and the extent to which that
interest was a factor in the negotiation of the contract." Westinghouse I, 517 F. Supp.
at 456.
10I Westinghouse I, 517 F. Supp. at 451. Judge Merhige also noted in passing the
origins of the U.C.C. test:
The commercial impracticability provisions of the U.C.C. merely codify
the pre-code common law of impossibility of performance ....
.. .Common law impossibility, formerly a very harsh doctrine which
purported to require a showing of objective or scientific impossibility, has
been moderated by case law to the point where it is equivalent to imprac-
ticability under the Code.
Id. at 450-51.
"I See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
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contract. 0 9
Unanticipated expenses, even approaching $100 million, cannot obviate
the foreseeability problem because a reasonable actor would take care
to "recognize and appreciate" the potential events that might affect the
contract.110 Using objective standards of reasonableness and foreseeabil-
ity, the court found the parties intended to keep the risk of the disrup-
tion on the promisor as Westinghouse knew of its uncertain capability
to perform its reprocessing obligation."' Ultimately, Judge Merhige in
Westinghouse I asked the parties and their experts to help the court
arrive at a settlement or to fashion appropriate relief: "The Court...
fervently hopes that it will not be called upon to draft a decree, not
because it would be difficult, but rather because the Court is convinced
that the parties themselves are in a far better position to find an equita-
109 517 F. Supp. at 454. Judge Merhige went on to criticize a subjective approach
to the search for intent:
Because the future is by definition unknowable, a rule holding the
obligor to performance only where he foresees, but fails to guard against,
the precise event that renders performance more difficult, would be mean-
ingless. . . .[I]t may be enough that he is (or should be) aware of a cer-
tain trend, or that a given state of affairs is in flux, or that an assumption
is more than usually uncertain.
...[TJhe foreseeability of the risk alone may well be sufficient for it
to be regarded as implicitly assumed by the promisor.
Id. at 454-56. Oddly, Judge Merhige here referred to the crop failure cases as paradig-
matic of unforeseeable events supporting the excuse. See supra note 37.
110 As the court described:
While this expense is high, it is not beyond the normal range of risk that a
promisor signing a fixed-price contract in a new high-risk field could have
expected. A loss alone is not sufficient to show commercial
impracticability ...
If Westinghouse had conducted any investigation whatsoever [at the
time the contract was made] . . . it would have been aware that the ex-
pense might be great. . . .An argument to the effect that any such poten-
tial costs were either unknown or incapable of ascertainment simply
strengthens the Court's conclusion that a reasonable company in the nu-
clear business would have recognized and appreciated the potentially high
cost.
Westinghouse 11, 597 F. Supp. at 1477-78.
... The court was unequivocal on this point:
Knowing full well Florida's requirements, and knowing that
reprocessing, not being available even then as a practical matter, was
highly uncertain, Westinghouse agreed to a contract term which in plain,
unequivocal, unqualified language, required it to remove the spent fuel
from Florida's plants. If this is not assumption of risk, the Court con-
fesses itself unable to discern what would be.
Westinghouse 1, 517 F. Supp. at 457.
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ble solution."" 2 The inability of the parties to reach such agreement
after three years necessitated the Westinghouse II opinion."'
Faced with the need to fashion relief in Westinghouse II, Judge
Merhige reexamined the question of foreseeability. He found that al-
though it was "foreseeable" to Westinghouse that there could be
problems, and considerable expense, attendant to removal and reproces-
sing of spent nuclear fuel, it was not foreseeable that the United States
government would fall twenty-five years behind schedule in fulfilling a
commitment to industry to create disposal facilities.11 4 Accordingly, al-
though the unavailability of reprocessing did not excuse Westinghouse's
refusal to remove the spent fuel, there was some degree of excusing
impracticability relating to the cost of providing long-term on-site stor-
age in the absence of any usable off-site disposal facilities.' Utilizing
"its own sense of fairness" ' and recognizing that there is "no precise
means for isolating the costs attributable to the unforeseeable de-
112 517 F. Supp. at 461. The judge continued:
[I]t is clear that, under the law, Westinghouse is liable to Florida for its
breach of contract. It must pay damages, or perform, or some combination
thereof, whether by agreement of the parties or by order of the court. The
former is . . . far preferable in light of the parties' greater ability to dis-
cern the best interests of both Florida's ratepayers and Westinghouse's
shareholders, and their greater experience in solving complex practical
problems.
Id. The court then referred to the good faith and diligence of Westinghouse in settling
the consolidated uranium litigation and offering to meet with counsel to aid in settle-
ment and to get expert advice. Id. at 461-62.
'" 597 F. Supp. 1456.
114 Id. at 1469-72.
115 The court's words are enlightening:
[The] failing on the part of the Government [to act in a timely fashion]
was an unforeseeable contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption of the contract and which has rendered performance of West-
inghouse's implicit timeliness obligation to Florida impossible. No one
could have anticipated the poor planning, delays, and policy reversals that
have added up to more than twenty years of delay, after the outlook for
commercial reprocessing became clouded, before the Government will be
providing any alternative. Both Florida and Westinghouse were aware
that reprocessing might not be available, but neither of them anticipated
that no alternative means of removal would be available until 1998 or
after ....
. . . The failing in the Government's policies was that a permanent
means of disposal was not available in time to avoid unnecessary costs for
interim storage . . . . [T]he Court is satisfied that at least some of the
interim storage costs must be attributed solely to unnecessary delays in the
fulfillment of the Government's implied commitments. Westinghouse can-
not fairly be held liable for the full amount of these unnecessary costs.
Consequently, the Court has determined that an equitable allocation
of the interim storage costs is in order.
Id. at 1478.
116 Id.
19871
1152 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
lays,"11 the court refused to hold Westinghouse responsible for the
costs of additional on-site storage." 8
The Westinghouse litigation exemplifies a flexible and integrative
approach to the complex problem of commercial impracticability within
the inherent limitations of existing judicial doctrine and capability.
Certainly Judge Merhige, in his concern for foreseeability, and not-
withstanding U.C.C. section 2-615, is consistent with the great bulk of
impracticability decisions." 9 The sophistication with which he treats
the interrelated issues of the quantification of "impracticability" and
intention-indicative "foreseeability" may represent the farthest reach of
presently applied doctrine. His express recognition of the interrelated-
ness of the various components of "impracticability" and his recognition
of the complexity of a "foreseeability" determination are an attempt to
make doctrine parallel the complexity and sophistication of the com-
mercial transaction involved.
It may be that, even with the effort expended, the focus on factors
indicative of some kind of presumed intent necessarily results in a
rather simple judicial reality: an event whose consequences are seri-
ously disruptive but not catastrophic will almost always be deemed to
have been foreseeable, and the promisor will be held to the promise
even if the event was not in fact foreseen or contemplated by the
parties.12 °
In positing a test of "foreseeability" the courts have attempted to
find a practical solution to the conundrum of fashioning doctrine with
respect to which parties may realistically plan within the context of
complicated and highly discrete litigation. That a test based on the fic-
tion of "foreseeability" is in many respects artificial and unrealistic is
beyond dispute. The issue, however, is whether such an "objective"
test, applied in a recursive fashion as part of an intention-based alloca-
tion effort is more workable than either the apparently subjective test
called for by the Code or another alternative.
The Code may have intended the abandonment of the "old fiction"
of an objectively presumed intent, but has it not then substituted for it
117 Id.
"1 The credit to Westinghouse for this re-racking operation amounted to approxi-
mately $12.7 million, the amount it would have cost the utility to perform the work,
even though Westinghouse had already undertaken to do it for $6 million. Id. at 1479.
1"9 See Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group Eng'rs, Inc., 775 F.2d 781 (7th Cir.
1985); see also supra notes 87-90.
10 See Hillman, supra note 69, at 652 ("[Wlhen losses to the promisor would be
moderate courts will not excuse performance, but when losses would be extreme and
the promisor has acted reasonably courts will excuse performance." (footnotes
omitted)).
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another kind of fiction?12 Is not the "fiction," new or old, that embod-
ied in the idea of "basic assumption" itself, that one can indeed find
unexpressed negative assumptions specifically referable to the disrup-
tive event?' 22 The courts use, and presumably will continue to use,
with varying degrees of sophistication, an apparently objective and ex-
tensible search for intent, the much-criticized foreseeability talisman.
As a matter of judicial capability, it appears to be more workable than
an attempt to reconstruct the parties' bargain and determine what each
actually contemplated or to decide what they would have done had they
thought about the matter. 2 '
The "foreseeability/foreseen" problem, however, focuses on the
wrong question. The use of the intent-indicative criterion of foresee-
121 See Trakman, supra note 10, at 477 ("Both the [Restatement] and the Uni-
form Commercial Code maintain the earlier practice of creating doctrine by way of
fiction.").
122 "The code thus perpetuates the fiction that underlying each contract is a 'basic
assumption' that the court is able to identify by ex post facto inquiry and that a judicial
finding of 'commercial impracticability' reflects what the parties would themselves have
decided had they anticipated the intervening disruption." Id. at 477-78 (footnotes
omitted).
Under the subjective theory, the implied term follows the intention of the
parties. . . . In its objective form, the theory maintains that the implied
term is that term which reasonable men would have included in the con-
tract to cover the situation if they had considered the matter. This . . . is
problematic because it clearly exposes the fictional nature of the implied
term and the theory's lack of fidelity to the idea that the parties, and not
the courts, make the contract, for the court's judgment is clearly all that
can be meant by the reasonable man standard.
• . . It is desirable. . . that some of these assumptions [which parties
make about the present and anticipated physical world] be taken into con-
sideration in determining to what point a contract should be treated as
binding. . . . The real problem with the implied term theory is that it
gives no clues by which to determine which assumptions should be consid-
ered in any situation, except in the force of the adjective-'basic' or 'fun-
damental'-used to describe the assumption.
Schlegel, supra note 33, at 443-44 (footnotes omitted); see also Stroh, supra note 33, at
219 ("[T]here is also no direction given to the court with respect to the manner in
which risks are to be allocated other than by determining the basic assumptions of the
parties.").
123 It has been argued that:
At its best, the formula is contrived. It is no simple matter for a court
to surmise whether the situation was foreseen by either or both parties,
and then to divine what either party would have done had he foreseen the
situation. Furthermore, where the court concludes that the parties would
have included a term, the plausibility of the exercise in composition that it
must undertake diminishes as the foreseeability of the casus omissus de-
creases, until finally the court finds itself in the uncomfortable position of
composing a term for a virtually unforeseeable situation.
Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 879-80 (footnotes omitted).
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ability"" is an attempt to keep the doctrine of excuse within the con-
fines of a determination of the "will" of the parties.'25 If we dislike the
concept of foreseeability, we might better ask whether intent, subjec-
tively or objectively determined, is an appropriate or even relevant con-
sideration in allocating the risks of seriously disruptive events and
whether there are any workable alternatives.
III. A SEARCH FOR SYNTHESIS
A. ALCOA: "Hardship" and the Abandonment of Intent
In ALCOA, Judge Teitelbaum constructed an approach to imprac-
ticability that turned on a determination of the hardship of continued
performance in the face of a supervening event, specifically, Alcoa's
projected losses of more than $75 million: "The focus of the doctrines
of impracticability and of frustration is distinctly on hardship ...
Performance may be impracticable because extreme and unreasonable
difficulty, expense, injury, or loss to one of the parties will be in-
volved."'12 6 Looking at the massive losses projected by Alcoa, he found
each of the traditional impracticability authorities'2 7 "distinguishable
* . . in the absolute extent of the loss and in the proportion of loss
involved.' 28 The loss ostensibly to be visited upon Alcoa made per-
formance impracticable in much the same sense as the court in Mineral
Park v. Howard found performance impracticable: performance was
"commercially" impossible.
124 Of course, the foreseeability inquiry is multi-functional. In Judge Merhige's
analysis of Westinghouse's conduct it is also used as an indicator of fault; i.e., Westing-
house, acting in the face of "foreseeable" problems, albeit nonquantifiable ones, was
essentially either negligent or consciously taking a gamble. See Westinghouse II, 597 F.
Supp. 1456, 1475-76 (E.D. Va. 1984).
125 Cf Gillette, supra note 24, at 524 (arguing that a contract is a "mechanism
for individual expression by commercial actors capable of considering and bearing the
consequences of reasoned choice").
126 499 F. Supp. 53, 72 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (emphasis in original). Judge Teitel-
baum initially justified relief on grounds of "mistake" with respect to the efficiency of
the index as a risk limiting device. Id. at 60-70. His approach to the mistake doctrine,
itself an apparently extreme departure from tradition not generally followed, is outside
the scope of this article. See, e.g., Westinghouse I, 517 F. Supp. 440, 458 (E.D. Va.
1981) (Judge Merhige holding that he "has, most respectfully, some difficulty with the
holding in ALCOA").
12 ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 74 (citing Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States,
363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966)); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F.
Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 989 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist.,
76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974)).
128 ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 74.
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In taking this hardship-based approach, Judge Teitelbaum went
beyond simply distinguishing the strong body of contrary authority. He
essentially rejected the judicial past, 29 discarding the intent-driven fic-
tion of foreseeability: "If it were important to the decision of this case,
the Court would hold that the foreseeability of a variation between the
[Wholesale Price Index for Industrial Commodities] and Alcoa's costs
would not preclude relief under the doctrine of impracticability."13 In
fact, he ignored the centrality of the concept of intent itself, opting in-
stead for an analytic framework with a base far broader than that of
the presumed intent of the parties:
The [Uniform Commercial] Code seeks. . . to accommodate
the law to sound commercial sense and practice. Courts must
decide the point at which the community's interest in pre-
dictable contract enforcement shall yield to the fact that en-
forcement of a particular contract would be commercially
senseless and unjust. The spirit of the Code is that such deci-
sions cannot justly derive from legal abstractions. They must
derive from courts sensitive to the mores, practices and habits
of thought in the respectable commercial world.1"1
In this passage, Judge Teitelbaum takes the position that "hardship in
various garbs provides a justification for the court to police the transac-
tion in the interest of fairness."
1 3 2
There is much to be said for a coherent doctrine that is not depen-
dent on the search for intent. 33 It has been suggested that "[t]he ques-
"I9 He does, however, lean heavily on qualifying dicta in Transatlantic Financ-
ing, 363 F.2d at 318. See ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 76.
1' ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 76. Strictly speaking, of course, this is dicta since he
finds some degree of unforeseeability. His statement rejecting foreseeability is, however,
significantly stronger than that of Judge Wright in Transatlantic Financing, 363 F.2d
312.
13' ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 76. Aluminum ore processing requires large expend-
itures of electrical energy. That aluminum processing is extraordinarily dependent
upon the generation of electricity and the concomitant supply of fuel to provide such
generation suggests that Alcoa should have been peculiarly aware of matters relating to
energy production and the possibility of severe disruption in the fuel market. An argu-
ment might well be made that Alcoa, with respect to the uncertainty of the interna-
tional petroleum situation, was situated similarly to Westinghouse with respect to the
uncertainties of the disposal and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. To the extent that
Westinghouse was somehow "at fault" or indifferent to its own risks, so too was Alcoa.
Judge Teitelbaum's eliding of this issue by emphasizing Alcoa's attempt to limit risk
through the WPI indexing hardly seems satisfactory. See id. at 68-70.
13' New Spirit, supra note 10, at 201 (suggesting that the ALCOA case is indica-
tive of a growing recognition of this position).
3 As was observed more than forty-five years ago:
"Intention of the parties" is a good formula by which to square doctrine
with result. That this is true has long been an open secret. Of course,
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tion . . . is not what the parties intended but rather, how the losses
should be allocated. . . .The judicial function becomes one of weigh-
ing equities and balancing interests .... ,13 Moreover, some scholars
suggest that resolution devices based upon intent are not appropriate
for solving problems caused by a "failure in the agreement":
135
As the parties cannot agree, the court can only look to ex-
trinsic standards of fairness for a solution. . . .It would be
irrational not to recognize contractual accidents and to refuse
to make adjustments when they occur. The gaps cannot be
filled, the adjustments cannot be governed, by the promise
principle. 3 6
There are too many reasons why parties might simply have had no
intention or expectation with respect to some conjectural matter ancil-
lary to their contractual concerns or why matters contemplated by one
or both of them are omitted from their contract."3 "
The concept of "hardship," however, provides no firmer basis for
shifting the risk from the promisor to the promisee than the imperfect
"foreseeability" doctrine. We may quarrel with the centrality accorded
foreseeability, but we have not reached a sound, unified consensus as to
where intent, though obscure, is nevertheless discernible, it must be fol-
lowed; but a certain sophistication must be recognized-if we are to ap-
proach the matter frankly-where we are dealing with changed circum-
stances . .. with respect to a contract which does not touch this exact
point and which has at most only points of departure for more or less
pressing analogies.
Parev Prods. Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, 124 F.2d 147, 149 (2d Cir. 1941). One com-
mentator has gone so far as to say that: "If the goal of impracticability analysis remains
effectuation of party intent, impracticability analysis will remain largely incoherent."
Sirianni, supra note 10, at 83.
1 Speziale, supra note 15, at 588.
135 C. FRIED, supra note 14, at 61-63, 69.
136 Id. at 63, 69; cf. Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 875 (suggesting that the con-
tract does not have a "gap" to be filled but is simply not applicable: "Their language,
properly interpreted, simply did not apply to the situation at all; it was not one of the
significant situations for which the language was intended. . . .To establish a casus
omissus it is enough that neither party intended the language to cover the case. .. .
... As Farnsworth observed:
In contrast to the . . . fiction, which assumes that the parties have expec-
tations concerning all possible situations, is the likelihood that they give
their "limited attention" only to a limited number of situations which they
choose by some initial process of selection. . ..
• . .[Secondly, i]nstead of attempting to reduce all of their expecta-
tions to contract language, the parties again confine their "limited atten-
tion" to a limited number of expectations selected as particularly suitable
for inclusion in the contract.
Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 869-70 (footnotes omitted).
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what constitutes "hardship" ' or what is in fact "commercially sense-
less" to make these concepts the basis of a modern doctrine of excuse.1 3 9
Neither of these concepts supplies the luxury of the stark either/or in-
quiry possible in cases of physical impossibility that allows one to de-
velop and apply excuse doctrine without an intent-based analysis. From
the perspective of doctrinal formation, the issues are too new, the events
too fresh, for the articulation of deductive doctrine. In light of recent
experience with disruptive events, the boundaries for determinations of
"hardship" and "senselessness" cannot yet be drawn with bright lines:
gray predominates. Ultimately, then, it is not so much the abandon-
ment of intent as it is the lack of articulation of a standard less ephem-
eral than "hardship" that has prevented ALCOA from serving as the
basis for a new doctrine of excuse. The result for ALCOA, at least with
respect to the determination of the existence of an "excuse," is the same
as that for Mineral Park: the case, for the purposes of developing a
doctrine of excuse, cannot take us beyond its own facts.1 40
B. Efficiency
1. Efficiency as a Criterion for a Coherent Doctrine of Excuse
It has been urged that the principal purpose of contract is the pro-
motion of efficiency in exchange: "If the purpose of the law of contracts
is to effectuate the desires of the contracting parties, then the proper
criterion for evaluating the rules of contract law is surely that of eco-
nomic efficiency. . . .A law of contract not based on efficiency consid-
erations will . . . be largely futile. 14 1 Accepting the efficiency purpose,
131 Traditionally, hardship has been the foundation for quantifying impracticabil-
ity and the preoccupation "with the arithmetic of loss." Speidel, supra note 5, at 267.
"' See Schwartz, Sales Law and Inflation, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 11 (1976)
(discussing the unsatisfactory and arbitrary nature of tests based on "harshness" or
"desert" which require, ultimately, that courts "make factual findings and economic
judgments of such complexity that the parties would often be unable to predict judicial
outcomes").
1'0 The controversy generated by ALCOA has been concerned more with Judge
Teitelbaum's decision to have the risk shared, allocated between the parties instead of
left with one of them, than with his remarkable and precedent-breaking determinations
of impracticability and frustration. The lack of impact of these doctrinal determinations
stems largely from their ipse dixit nature and consequential limited extensibility. Al-
though his opinion elaborates and extends the boundaries of "mutual mistake," AL-
COA, 499 F. Supp. 53, 60-70 (E.D. Pa. 1980), Judge Teitelbaum provides no concep-
tual framework for extending his determination of impracticability and frustration
beyond the case itself.
1 Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law:
An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 89 (1977). See Bruce, An Economic
Analysis of the Impossibility Doctrine, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 311, 321 (1982) ("[Tihe
overriding, economic function of contract law is the attainment of efficiency in ex-
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it is possible to construct a doctrine of excuse that abandons the foresee-
ability-based approach to presumed intent, yet maintains the overriding
fiction of following the will of the parties. For example, those who ad-
vocate that risk be allocated on the basis of an economic determination
of which party is the "superior risk bearer"' 4 2 assume that such an
approach is consistent with the parties' presumed intention to contract
efficiently. 143 The quarrel then with foreseeability as an index of intent
is that "it fails to indicate which contracting party is the superior
bearer of the foreseeable risk."'1 4 4 For efficiency advocates, where a
question of the impracticability of performance arises in the face of con-
tractual silence, the issue is simply one of finding the most efficient
means of allocating risk. 45 The inquiry revolves around a determina-
tion of who is the most efficient putative insurer,1 46 the "superior risk
bearer.' 47 Insurance, or the potential to insure, becomes the deus ex
machina to resolve all plot complications.
An efficiency-based approach to excuse does indeed eliminate the
fictions of both imputed intent and basic assumptions. If one of the
parties is the "superior risk bearer," then, absent an express assump-
tion of the risk by the other party, the "superior risk bearer" shoulders
the risk. Any other result would imperil efficiency. Judge Posner sug-
gests that the courts have, without articulation, 4 8 followed economic
efficiency norms and that an efficiency analysis goes far toward ratio-
nalizing the decisions of the courts: 49 the party upon whom the courts
change."); Note, The Economic Implications of the Doctrine of Impossibility, 26 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1251, 1252 (1975) ("[A] contract principle is justified whenever its opera-
tion produces a more efficient distribution of resources. To say that a legal doctrine is
economically efficient is to say that that doctrine makes society better off.").
142 Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 141, at 90.
143 See Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265,
278 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) ("[IImpossibility and related doctrines are devices for
shifting risk in accordance with the parties' presumed intentions, which are to minimize
the costs of contract performance, one of which is the disutility created by risk . . ").
14 Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 141, at 100.
145 Id. at 86.
148 Id. at 90.
147 Id. ("From the standpoint of economics ... discharge should be allowed
where the promisee is the superior risk bearer; if the promisor is the superior risk
bearer, nonperformance should be treated as a breach of contract.").
148 But see Asphalt Int'l, Inc. v. Enterprise Shipping Corp., 667 F.2d 261, 266
n.5 (2d Cir. 1981) ("The fundamental question involves the appropriate allocation of
risk, that should be determined according to which party was in the better position to
insure against the various losses occasioned by the [event]."). Of course from the bench,
Judge Posner has been able to contribute explicit judicial opinion with respect to these
norms. See, e.g., Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d
265, 278 (7th Cir. 1986).
141 Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 141, at 89 ("[There] is a powerful reason for
expecting that the law of contracts has, in fact, been informed by efficiency considera-
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have allowed the risk of loss to rest has indeed been the "superior risk
bearer." Thus, in the case of impracticability brought about by disrup-
tive events, it is only logical that the seller/promisor is almost always
held to its promise-the promisor is generally the "superior risk
bearer" and, thus, should be so held.1"'
Framed differently, the "superior risk bearer" analysis is a deter-
mination of which party is better able to control either the risk or its
consequences. 51 Discharge is appropriate only for a promisor who
"has taken the optimal level of precautions both to ensure performance
and to mitigate damages. 1 52 Even then, discharge may not be appro-
priate if "the promisee has [also] mitigate[d] damages and . . . the
costs to the promisor of obtaining insurance against the effects of non-
performance are less than those to the promisee. 15' Any doubt is re-
solved by placing "the burden on the party best able to spread the loss
or absorb it.
1 54
2. The Failure of the Efficiency-Based Model: Problems of
Capacity and Values
Even if one accepts the proposition that "efficiency" is the primary
goal in regulating contractual arrangements, a "control" or "superior
risk bearer" approach to resolving the problem of contractual silence
with respect to a disruptive event is of limited utility. It necessarily
results in a narrow jurisprudence founded on hindsight and idiosyn-
cratic factual analysis. Even the problems created by intention-based
analyses pale in comparison to those posed when one must examine
tions, even if judges and lawyers have found it difficult to articulate the underlying
economic premises of the law."). But ef. Sirianni, supra note 10, at 69 ("Posner's claim
that impracticability decisions tend to follow his analysis is at best undemonstrable.").
150 But see Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 141, at 111 ("The performer is not
always the superior risk bearer; otherwise there would be no place in contract law for
impossibility and related doctrines. But as long as the performer is generally the supe-
rior risk bearer, assigning the risk to him in cases of doubt-that is, refusing discharge
in those cases-can be expected to yield correct results more often than the contrary
rule.").
15I As one commentator states:
A party assumes responsibility for that proportion of performance risks
and ensuing losses that are within that party's 'control'. [Such 'control'
exists when a party is better able] (1) to contemplate both the advent of
the risk that intervened and its probable effect upon performance, and (2)
to avert or mitigate the performance losses produced by that performance
risk.
Trakman, supra note 10, at 506 n.106.
152 Bruce, supra note 141, at 321.
153 Id. at 322.
11" Speidel, supra note 5, at 242 n.3 (citation omitted).
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each case ex post to make an economic determination of which party
had "control" or which party might have been better able to "spread"
or "bear" the consequences of the event.
The efficiency analysis, whether in terms of "superior risk bearer"
or "least-cost bearer,"1 55 or more general efficiency criteria,'5" is a de-
termination as to how two supposedly risk averse parties would have
allocated the risk of disruptive events had they been required specifi-
cally to do so and had their goal been an efficient, least-cost, present
transaction. What is involved is a complicated set of trade-offs relating
to how much each party would have been willing to pay to have the
other assume the risk.15 7 Efficient rule-making at contracting time thus
requires an ex ante determination of the relevant factors and the appro-
priate and optimal balance.' 58 When a dispute arises, however, judg-
ments are made ex post. One must question whether the parties them-
selves, let alone the courts, are equipped to make an analysis of the
efficiency-relevant circumstances as they existed at the inception of the
155 Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract,
89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1285 (1980) ("The least-cost bearer of any risk will presumably
agree to absorb that risk in exchange for an enhanced return promise.").
15 See generally Cooter & Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1432 (1985).
157 Thus, "[w]hen a regret contingency arises, the promisor's options are either to
bear the loss attributable to performance, which now costs more than it is worth, or to
breach and accept the cost of any corresponding sanction. Presumably the promisor
would adopt the cheaper of these regret costs." Goetz & Scott, supra note 155, at 1273.
Further,
[t]he risk of ... regret contingency can be allocated several ways. On the
one hand, nonenforcement of promises induces self-protective reductions in
reliance by the promisee. These, in turn, may trigger reassurance reactions
from the promisor. On the other hand, enforcement of promises increases
promisee reliance, but also induces precautionary adjustments by the
promisor. The social cost of the regret contingency is minimized when the
optimal interactive adaptations are encouraged.
Id. at 1287.
155 More explicitly:
If in certain transactions precautionary efforts by promisors would be
more expensive than reassurance, nonenforcement enables the parties to
shift the risk of regret more cheaply. Alternatively, when reassurance is
more costly, fully enforcing promises induces cheaper precautionary con-
duct. If each type of transaction can be identified ex ante, specifying the
cost-effective rule in advance produces the outcome that the parties would
reach if they bargained over legal liability for breach.
Id. at 1293. See also Birmingham, supra note 26, at 1400 ("[11n cases where frustra-
tion of contract is at issue, unnecessarily inadequate economic analysis frequently leads
to inaccurate conclusions concerning the equity of possible solutions." ); id. at 1415
("[A] deeper probing of the economic consequences of the unexpected occurrence form-
ing the basis of claims of frustration will frequently lead to revised calculations con-
cerning the amount of resulting gain or loss and offer new guidelines for its
distribution.").
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transaction. Such an analysis would seem to amount to little more than
conjecture when used to determine how the parties would have handled
the risk of the disruptive event had they been aware of it.'5 '
An efficiency-based test might be workable, however, if the bound-
aries of the excusing circumstances are so narrowed that the test is ap-
plied only in the most exceptional cases,' or, alternatively, if every
contract of any magnitude be accompanied at its inception by an "eco-
nomic impact" statement. The former approach is exemplified in Judge
Posner's opinion in Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Carbon
County Coal Co.'
The plaintiff ("NIPSCO") had entered into a twenty-year con-
tract to purchase coal from the defendant ("Carbon County"). The
contract fixed both the quantity and the price to be paid, subject only to
upward adjustment."0 2 The coal was to be used by NIPSCO to gener-
ate electricity for sale to consumers. As fuel prices began sharply to
decline, NIPSCO found itself able to buy electricity from others more
cheaply than it could generate its own electricity with the coal pur-
chased from Carbon County. When the Indiana Public Service Com-
mission ruled essentially that the additional costs involved in generation
could not be passed on to NIPSCO's customers, NIPSCO stopped tak-
ing coal deliveries from Carbon County and sought a declaration that it
was excused from its purchase obligations under the contract.' 63 Car-
bon County counterclaimed for breach of contract and, after a jury
trial, received judgment for $181 million.1
64
Judge Posner characterized commercial impracticability and frus-
tration165 as "doctrines for shifting risk to the party better able to bear
159 See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 69, at 626 ("[E]mploying hindsight to ascertain
the efficient allocation will be problematic in many instances."); see also Sirianni,
supra note 10, at 72 ("It is not feasible [for the court] to sort through the infinite
number of insurance options available to any party to determine how such party might
have insured most cheaply." (citation omitted)); Price Adjustments, supra note 10, at
396-97 ("[I]t has been questioned . . . whether a court is capable of managing the
complexities of a Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency analysis." (citation omitted)).
160 In this formulation, the great bulk of the cases would still be decided on the
basis of fixed, situational doctrine.
161 799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986).
162 The contract was signed in 1978. NIPSCO obligated itself to buy 1.5 million
tons each year for twenty years at an initial price of $24 per ton, which, by virtue of
the upward adjustment provisions, had escalated to $44 per ton by 1985. Id. at 267.
163 Id. at 267-68.
164 Id. at 268.
16" Judge Posner notes that there is some doubt whether Indiana law allows a
buyer to avail itself of U.C.C. section 2-615 or recognizes the doctrine of frustration as
a buyer's common law remedy analogous to Code impracticability. Id. at 276-78.
The cases in which it is the buyer who seeks relief are more accurately considered
cases involving claims of "frustration of purpose." See, e.g., Northern Ind., 799 F.2d at
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it, either because he is in a better position to prevent the risk from
277; Scullin Steel Co. v. PACCAR, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 756, 762 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
But cf. International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879 (10th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1196 (1986), discussed supra note 68. The doctrine of
frustration arose initially as an extension of the Taylor v. Caldwell impossibility doc-
trine applied to the English Coronation cases (Krell v. Henry, 2 K.B. 740 (1903)). See
Anderson, Frustration of Contract-A Rejected Doctrine, 3 DE PAUL L. REv. 1, 1
(1953); Schlegel, supra note 33, at 422-23.
Excuse for frustration is not limited to the buyer and it is frequently coupled with
impracticability, as it was in ALCOA, where relief was predicated on both grounds, as
well as that of "mutual mistake." 499 F. Supp. at 78 ("[Tlhere is no legitimate doctri-
nal problem which prevents relief for frustration . . . of the purpose to earn money or
to avoid losses . . ... "). However, such losses must be significant. See Valencia Center
v. Publix Super Mkts., 464 So. 2d 1267, 1270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("feelings of
financial frustration do not necessarily equate to findings of frustration or impossibility
under the law"); cf. Printing Indus. Ass'n v. International Printing & Graphic Com-
munications Union, Local 56, 584 F. Supp. 990, 999-1002 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (unantic-
ipated wage increase of 5.9% insufficient to support a claim for reformation based on
frustration of purpose). As one court described the frustration cases: "[W]here a party's
principle purpose is frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event, the non-
occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his re-
maining duties to render performance are discharged, unless the language or the cir-
cumstances indicate to the contrary." Scullin Steel, 708 S.W. 2d at 762 (citing RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981)).
This language of course is similar to that used to describe impracticability. Yet,
there are significant conceptual differences between impracticability and frustration. As
the court noted in Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 53, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (1944):
Although the doctrine of frustration is akin to the doctrine of impossibility
of performance. . . since both have developed from the commercial neces-
sity of excusing performance in cases of extreme hardship, frustration is
not a form of impossibility even under the modern definition of that term,
which includes not only cases of physical impossibility but also cases of
extreme impracticability of performance. Performance remains possible
but the expected value of performance to the party seeking to be excused
has been destroyed by the fortuitous event, which supervenes to cause an
actual but not literal failure of consideration.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Anderson, supra, at 4 ("[Tlhe concepts of frustration of
contract and impossibility of performance are mutually in opposition: the situation
where a defendant claims the defense of frustration is where performance by him is
fully possible but the exchange has become undesirable . . . ."). In fact, frustration has
been invoked with even less success than impracticability. See id.; Birmingham, supra
note 26, at 1396 ("The doctrine of frustration is almost unused in American law.");
see, e.g., Scullin Steel, 708 S.W.2d at 760-64 (The existence of a "long term non-
cancellable contract" fixing price and quantity precluded excuse on the basis of frustra-
tion caused by events effectively destroying the market for the goods involved.); Valen-
cia Center, 464 So. 2d at 1269 (since purpose of lease was to rent property, no release
for frustration where unanticipated tax increases occurred). But cf. Chemical Bank v.
Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 102 Wash. 2d 874, 897-98, 691 P.2d 524, 538
(1984) (Previous judicial decision excusing 70% of participants to a long-term contract
was sufficient frustration to release remaining participants.).
Nevertheless, for purposes of dealing with "contractual accidents," the distinction
need not be considered significant. In fact, it has been urged that physical impossibility,
commercial impracticability, and frustration of purpose should all be considered as part
of one overall category: contractual frustration. See, e.g., Bruce, supra note 141, at 311
n.1; Dawson, supra note 10, at 3-4; Harrison, supra note 24, at 575; Sirianni, supra
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materializing or because he can better reduce the disutility of the risk if
the risk does occur."16 The excusing doctrines will not apply "when
the contract explicitly assigns a particular risk to one party or the
other.1 16 7 Judge Posner concluded that such an explicit assignment
was, in fact, inherent in a fixed-price contract:
[A] fixed-price contract is an explicit assignment of the risk
of market price increases to the seller and the risk of market
price decreases to the buyer. ... If. . .the buyer forecasts
the market incorrectly and therefore finds himself locked into
a disadvantageous contract, he has only himself to blame and
so cannot shift the risk back to the seller by invoking impos-
sibility or related doctrines. . . .Since "the very purpose of
a fixed price agreement is to place the risk of increased costs
on the promisor (and the risk of decreased costs on the prom-
isee)," the fact that costs decrease steeply . . .cannot allow
the buyer to walk away from the contract. 68
Thus, by making an absolute doctrinal determination, the analytic
problems inherent in applying efficiency analysis or a "superior risk
bearer" test to this complicated situation were simply elided.
Although Judge Posner cited Westinghouse I, he avoided Judge
note 10, at 32. As the court in McGinnis v. Cayton stated: "Frustration of purpose,
.impossibility and commercial impracticability combine to illustrate a doctrine that pro-
tects parties from the effects of uncontemplated, unallocated, supervening events. While
each separate category may have its own definition, they are sufficiently similar to put
in one class." 312 S.E.2d 765, 774 n.11 (W. Va. 1984) (Harshbarger, J., concurring);
see also Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 141, at 86 ("There is . . .no functional
distinction between impossibility and frustration cases on the one hand and impractica-
bility cases on the other. In every discharge case the basic problem is the same: to
decide who should bear the loss resulting from an event that has rendered performance
by one party uneconomical." (citation omitted)).
"6 Northern Ind., 799 F.2d at 278. He cites as an example the crop failure situa-
tion, analyzing it not in terms of simple impossibility doctrine, see supra note 37 and
accompanying text, but in terms of risk absorption:
Suppose a grower agrees before the growing season to sell his crop to a
grain elevator, and the crop is destroyed by blight and the grain elevator
sues. Discharge is ordinarily allowed in such cases. The grower has every
incentive to avoid the blight; so if it occurs, it probably could not have
been prevented; and the grain elevator, which buys from a variety of
growers not all of whom will be hit by blight in the same growing season,
is in a better position to buffer the risk of blight than the grower is.
799 F.2d at 278 (citations omitted).
167 Id.
188 Id. (citing Westinghouse I, 517 F. Supp. 440, 453 (7th Cir. 1974)). See also
Langham-Hill Petroleum Inc. v. Southern Fuels Co., 811 F.2d 1327, 1330 (4th Cir.
1987) ("If fixed-price contracts can be avoided due to fluctuations in price, then the
entire purpose of fixed-price contracts, which is to protect both the buyer and the seller
from the risks of the market, is defeated.").
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Merhige's recursive analysis of the magnitude of the "loss" and foresee-
ability of the disruptive event.169 As Judge Posner did not consider the
fact that the Northern Indiana contract was signed at a time of contin-
ually rising fuel costs to be material, there was no need to inquire into
the foreseeability of a sudden decline. While he recognized that the
market had changed radically,17 that change, whether or not it was
foreseeable, or within NIPSCO's "control," or "insurable" by either
party, could not give rise to an excuse or adjustment in the face of the
existence of a fixed-price contract: "The reason why NIPSCO must
pay Carbon County's loss is not that it should have continued buying
coal it didn't need but that the contract assigned to NIPSCO the risk of
market changes that made continued deliveries uneconomical."171 Thus,
NIPSCO was required to pay damages of $181 million172 notwith-
standing the promotion of overall economic efficiency attendant to NIP-
SCO's breach.
1 73
It must be conceded that the absolute doctrinal determination that
a fixed price contract by its nature allocates the risks of any given mar-
ket change creates predictability and procedural stability,174 although
169 As for ALCOA, it is simply ignored, notwithstanding the mirror-image sym-
metry of that case. Where Judge Posner was impressed by the fact that the contract
provided a price floor with no ceiling on upward adjustment, Judge Teitelbaum found
both impracticability and frustration excusing the seller even though the contract con-
tained a ceiling but no floor. As Judge Teitelbaum stated:
Clear hindsight suggests the flaw might have been anticipated and cured
by a "floor" resembling the . . . "cap" that Essex wrote into the price
formula. To the extent this possibility might be thought material to the
case, the Court specifically finds that when the contract was made, even
people of exceptional prudence and foresight would not have anticipated a
need for this additional limitation to achieve the purpose of the parties.
ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 64 n.5. Compare id. with Northern Ind., 799 F.2d at 278
("[T]he assignment of the . . . risk to the buyer is even clearer where, as in this case,
the contract places a floor under price but allows for escalation.").
170 799 F.2d at 279 ("With the collapse of oil prices, which has depressed the
price of substitute fuels as well, this coal costs far more to get out of ground than it is
worth in the market.").
171 Id.
1712 Id. This amount is "a reasonable estimate of the present value of the differ-
ence" between the contract price and the cost of mining the coal over the remaining life
of the contract. Id.
1I In denying Carbon County's request for specific performance rather than dam-
ages, Judge Posner noted that "[clontinuing to produce [the coal] ...would impose
costs on society greater than the benefits. NIPSCO's breach . . . was an efficient
breach in the sense that it brought to a halt a production process that was no longer
cost-justified." Id.
114 Goetz & Scott, supra note 155, at 1290 ("Clarity is enhanced by use of a
substantive rule that reduces the number and complexity of facts to be determined. A
clear rule, such as nonenforcement or full performance compensation, yields benefits of
reduced litigation costs and increased procedural accuracy.").
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not necessarily efficiency."75 In view of the capability problem inherent
in applying an efficiency analysis at the dispute stage to determine risk
allocation, it is understandable, albeit surprising, that Judge Posner
chose to apply an absolute risk allocating rule rather than to attempt to
determine which of the parties was the superior or economically effi-
cient risk bearer.
The problem of judicial capability is not the only obstacle to the
use of an efficiency analysis in allocating risk. The underlying norma-
tive assumptions of the primacy of efficiency in exchange, both soci-
etally and as between the parties to a given transaction, and of the
centrality of risk aversion in determining efficiency are themselves
questionable:' 78 "Economists commonly invoke risk aversion in analyz-
ing contracts. It is an 'easy' explanation and it is tempting to end the
search at .that point. . . . There are . . . a lot of reasons [for long-term
fixed price contracts], but risk aversion provides a convenient excuse for
not bothering to look.3
1 7 7
Efficiency analysis is a tool, in many ways an elegant 78 tool that
has value as an ex ante planning device and an aid to inquiry. How-
ever, it's utility beyond these functions is doubtful "because parties do
not always allocate risks efficiently.' 7 9 Where we face the problem of
allocating risks not expressly allocated by the parties' agreement, too
many factors are present to allow us to point to one, and only one,
optimal analytic framework. 8 °
'15 Id. at 1290-91 ("The primary cost of a clear rule is that it regulates promis-
sory conduct imprecisely .... [A] particular rule is efficient when both substantive
and procedural components are constructed so as to provide the cost-minimizing bal-
ance between accuracy and clarity." (citation omitted)).
178 See, e.g., Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. &
PUB. Arr. 3, 32-41 (1975) (arguing that maximizing market value measured by will-
ingness to pay does not necessarily maximize social value); cf. Leff, Economic Analysis
of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451 (1974) (generally criti-
cizing the economic analysis of law model).
177 Goldberg, supra note 10, at 529-30 (citations omitted).
178 Sirianni, supra note 10, at 69 (stating that "Posner's theory is challenging and
elegant . . .[but] its contribution is limited).
170 Hillman, supra note 69, at 626 ("For example, a party may be willing to
sacrifice gain in the short run, if it expects that immediate concessions will result in
greater gain in future agreements."); see also Sirianni, supra note 10, at 69 ("Parties
may rationally decide not to allocate relevant risks.").
180 See Gillette, supra note 24, at 526 ("[N]o rule is necessarily advantageous in
reducing transaction costs, and the gap-filling rule must serve some societal objective
other than the elusive goal of efficient exchange.").
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C. The Relational Model and the Expansion of the Doctrine of
Excuse
1. Policy Concerns: Balancing Equity and Certainty
The assertion that "[t]he mere fact that a contract becomes more
difficult or expensive than originally anticipated does not justify setting
it aside"'"" is self-evident. Determination of when difficulty or expense
will warrant relief, and the nature of that relief, rests ultimately on
public policy with respect to contractual relationships. Both the doctri-
nal determination that a fixed price in a long-term contract is an une-
quivocal statement of risk allocation" 2 and its judicial negation' 83 pre-
suppose one or another policy consensus. For example, the conclusive
risk allocation with respect to severe disruptions affecting price provides
greater predictability and ease of application than either a,"foreseeabil-
ity-based" search for objective, presumed intent or an evidentiary in-
quiry into actual intent long after the inception of the contract. 84 The
problem, however, and the reason for the conflicting judicial attitudes,
is that neither efficiency nor predictability and ease of application are
the only plausible and valuable policy considerations. These varied pol-
icy considerations are dramatically evident in the West Virginia Su-
preme Court opinions in McGinnis v. Cayton.'85
The parties in McGinnis were the successors in interest under an
oil and gas lease executed in 1893. The lease required the lessee to pay
a percentage royalty on oil produced on the property and, if marketable
gas were produced, a fixed royalty of $100 per year so long as such
production continued. No gas was produced until 1978. When produc-
tion started, the lessors sought to have the lease either avoided or re-
formed on the grounds, essentially, that the lessee received a windfall
from the fact that eighty-five years earlier no one had anticipated the
profitability to be derived from natural gas production. The lessee
sought summary judgment, principally on the basis of the fixed-price
provision in the lease.
11 Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 104 Wash.
2d 353, 364, 705 P.2d 1195, 1204 (1985) (citations omitted), modified, 713 P.2d 1109
(1986).
182 See, e.g., Northern Ind., 799 F.2d at 278; Scullin Steel Co. v. PACCAR, Inc.,
708 S.W.2d 756, 762 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
183 See, e.g., ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 64 n.5; cf. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Jewell
Coal & Coke Co., 735 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1984).
184 See Northern Ind., 799 F.2d at 278; Scullin Steel, 708 S.W.2d at 762 (stating
that PACCAR, as buyer, by entering into a long-term contract with a fixed price and
quantity, assumed the risk of a virtual cessation of the market for its product).
185 312 S.E.2d 765 (W. Va. 1984).
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A majority of the court held summary judgment inappropriate be-
cause of the possibility, however remote, that the lessor might have
some claim based upon "mutual mistake."' 86 Judge Harshbarger, how-
ever, in his concurring opinion,'187 raised troubling questions. Objecting
to the majority's limited focus on mistake, he expressed concern that
"[t]he opinion works an injustice 'in the name of the law,' ignores equi-
table principles, and hurts hundreds of West Virginia landowners."' 88
[Tihere has been a positive movement away from strict and
rigid rules of law in order to accommodate long-term con-
tracts that have become manifestly unfair: evenness and eq-
uity should prevail over form, and justice demands whatever
flexibility is necessary to fill in contractual gaps and adapt to
unexpected changes.
"Freedom of contract" means freedom to agree or as-
sent; not freedom to be forced to agree, to be presumed to
have assented, to be cornered into something that one has not
remotely considered, or to be denied meaningful choice. This
theoretical and philosophical argument underlies the evolu-
tion of contract law . . . . "Freedom of contract" does not
vindicate tolerance of blatant inequities or unconscionable
acts. Our society values fundamental fairness, equality, hon-
esty, cooperation and ethics.' 89
Finding that commercial impracticability alone was not a satisfactory
device,' 90 Judge Harshbarger urged that the matter be considered in
terms of the "overall and gross imbalance, oppression, or unfairness"
186 See id. at 769. The majority took pains to note that the claim, for summary
judgment purposes, need only be "colorable." Indeed, it found that "[it is ... argua-
ble that the original lessor bore the risk of a rise in the value of natural gas by ac-
cepting a fixed price for the production of it on his land." Id. at 769. The majority also
noted that, on remand, in addition to establishing the requisite mutual mistake, the
lessor must meet the burden of establishing "that the contract did not allocate the risk
of changed conditions." Id. at 770. Given the tenor of the opinion, it is likely that the
burden is insurmountable.
187 Id. at 770.
... Id. (Harshbarger, J., concurring).
189 Id. at 772 (Harshbarger, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
... The opinion traced in detail the obstacles a party faces in pursuing the im-
practicability excuse in the traditional sense:
This contract-escape route requires a disadvantaged party to show that he
was not at fault, that the supervening event was not reasonably foresee-
able, that neither party had assumed or allocated that risk, and that the
loss would be so severe and create such hardship that performance would
be commercially impractical.
Id. at 775 (Harshbarger, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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constituting "substantive unconscionability" as a basis for equitable ad-
justment.1 91 Optimally, he sought early resolution by the parties them-
selves; failing settlement, judicial intervention, an adjustment of the re-
lationship by exercise of the court's general equity powers would be
appropriate.19 2
Judge Harshbarger implies that an intention-based analysis has
little value when the issue is the amelioration of harshness, the avoid-
ance of opportunism, or the search for fairness. 93 It becomes necessary
to develop "fairness norms" upon which decisions may be based, rather
than fictions designed to aid the search for mutual intent."" Thus, it
has been suggested that adjustment is appropriate both when risk allo-
cation is unclear, and, if the hardship is severe enough, even when the
intention to allocate the risk is manifest.195
191 Id. at 779 (Harshbarger, J., concurring). Judge Harshbarger expressed irrita-
tion over judicial quibbling about what is or is not a "mutual mistake" and foreseeable.
Id. at 780 ("meaningless or purely semantic distinctions to reach specified results that
often [diminish] respect for the law"). He suggested that "[an unconscionability resolu-
tion may avoid semantic machinations while achieving the commendable goals of pre-
serving the contract's fairness and original equitable balance." Id. at n.26.
192 Judge Harshbarger addressed this issue at length:
Situations arising from contracts like [that at issue] recommend solu-
tions by interparty renegotiation. When that does not work, courts should
make themselves available to provide just and equitable resolutions with
the primary goal being to maintain the integrity of the long-term contrac-
tual relationship. This can be better achieved by remedies such as equita-
ble adjustment than rescission or discharge from performance.
Long-term contract problems that arise because of fundamental shifts
in the balance or equities of the original relationships are best resolved by
the parties. Courts should do all they can to encourage settlement and
private resolution ...
However, in the event that a court must intervene, it should only be
limited by its perception of fairness.
Id. at 779-81 (Harshbarger, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Judicial adjustment of the terms of the contract rather than total excuse upon a
finding of impracticability or frustration, is exactly the root of the controversy over the
ALCOA decision. Judge Harshbarger discussed ALCOA, both noting its lack of prece-
dential value and implicitly criticizing the cases refusing to follow it. Id. at 780
(Harshbarger, J., concurring). Nevertheless, he appears to have gone his own, rather
than Judge Teitelbaum's, way by predicating intervention upon broad grounds joining
concepts of impracticability and frustration to those of unconscionability and fairness.
193 See Hillman, supra note 69, at 625-27; cf Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 861
n.7 ("The civil law seems . . . largely to have avoided the common law's reliance on
'intention' in disputes over omission.").
14 See Hillman, supra note 69, at 626-27 ("When the court's view of fairness
controls the decision, courts should abandon the intentions construct and articulate
more precisely the bases for their decisions."). Hillman proposes a set of such norms,
encompassing consideration of comparative equities, avoidance of harm, reasonableness
of the conduct of the disadvantaged party and contractual reciprocity in the enjoyment
of "the fruits of an exchange." Id. at 629-39.
195 Id. at 636-37 ("Intervention. . .is least appropriate when the projected harm
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2. The Critique of Judicial Adjustment
Adjustment based on the broad exercise of equitable powers is an
intuitively appealing mechanism for dealing with the "contractual acci-
dent." Using this device, a court may "police the transaction in the
interest of fairness,"19  and avoid the "harsh and unjust results" 197 that
occur when courts are forced to place the loss on one party or the
other."9 By substituting a "winner take some" '99 for the "winner take
all" result inherent in the concept of "excuse," the severe consequences
of an absolute decision for either party are ameliorated. Loss sharing,
as was done in ALCOA, rather than allocating the entire burden to one
party, facilitates a more expansive application of the doctrines of im-
practicability and frustration.200
Professor Dawson has strongly condemned both ALCOA and the
advocates of adjustment intervention.20 1 He objects to the "pursuit of an
ephemeral equity . . . with the aim of manufacturing terms that are
truly new because new circumstances would make them seem more
just."2 2 He also sharply questions the existence of either judicial capa-
... results from a clearly allocated risk. Even when risk allocation is clear, however,
the prospect of severe harm to a party may override the justification of freedom of
contract. When risk allocation is unclear, the harm-avoidance norm protects each party
from inordinate loss resulting from the exchange in the absence of countervailing harm
to the other party.").
18 New Spirit, supra note 10, at 201. See Price Adjustments, supra note 10, at
395-419 (suggesting that courts should impose price adjustments as a manner of influ-
encing the bargaining process).
197 Comment, supra note 11, at 1001. See also Speidel, supra note 5, at 270 ("If
the seller has not assumed the risk of an event that has a substantial impact upon
performance, would not some important objectives of contract law be served by a decree
preserving the contract under a price adjusted by the court?").
19 For example, it has been suggested that:
Courts need not focus exclusively on ascertaining which party, for
doctrinal, economic, or other reasons, should be held responsible for the
entire cost of nonperformance. Past experience in both common- and civil-
law jurisdictions demonstrates that the allocation of losses arising from
nonperformance is a logical and equitable alternative to the imposition of
the full loss upon one contracting party.
...Partial foresight and partial control over disruptive contingencies
may justify partial relief.
Trakman, supra note 10, at 480-84 (emphasis in original).
199 Id. at 471.
200 See Harrison, supra note 24, at 596-97, 601; Price Adjustments, supra note
10, at 396-404, 411-14; Trakman, supra note 10, at 476-506; Comment, supra note
10, at 1100-01.
201 See Dawson, supra note 10, at 27-28.
202 Id. at 8-9.
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bility2"8 or power so to act.2"4 His ultimate concern, and what is proba--
bly the primary objection both to risk-sharing adjustment and to a gen-
erally expansive doctrine of excuse, is the impact upon planning and
predictability. Basically, he fears "a course so disastrous for the coher-
ence and rationality of our law of contract":20 5 "[S]urely it would make
a vast difference in the reliability and usefulness of contracts in our
society if our courts were to acquire a broad mandate to rewrite con-
tract terms that had, as a result of unforeseen events, produced on one
side an unexpected gain."20
To the detriment of clarity and doctrinal advancement, the debate
is conducted with loaded words: stability and predictability pitted
against fairness and flexibility. It should be evident that we need ulti-
mately to maximize all of these values. The excuse complex requires
balancing. To the extent that we view the concept of contract as
grounded on the terms of the agreement, application of excuse must be
limited and judicial intervention tightly circumscribed or "the coherence
and rationality of our law of contract" is indeed threatened.20 7 The real
issues, however, are what is "our law of contract" and to what is it
referable.
20I See id. at 28 ("[Wjhen basic provisions are revised by a judge, who knows only
what he can learn from presiding at a trial, the result will probably be so unacceptable
to both parties that by their own agreement they will reject the dictated terms and
reassert the right that they fortunately still retain, to recover control over their own
affairs.").
'" See id. at 18 ("If the contract that was previously in force has through frustra-
tion ceased to exist, how can the parties to it be compelled to accept a 'contract' that is
manufactured by a court to replace it?. . .Perhaps it is because our courts in these
cases have been for the most part so circumspect that when their conduct wanders off
limits it can be truly bizarre.").
205 Id. at 29.
208 Id. at 31. See also Sirianni, supra note 10, at 55 ("If other courts adopt the
ALCOA test, contracts-especially long-term ones-will become markedly less secure.
And there will be little basis upon which parties might ascertain in advance which
contracts are vulnerable to reformation or avoidance."). The fear of uncertainty in the
ultimate impact of such an approach beyond simply the parties to the dispute has also
been noted:
The well-entrenched belief in the sanctity of contracts is certainly a signif-
icant factor in [the restrictive] judicial attitude toward the commercial im-
practicability defense. Another significant factor is the uncertainty that ap-
plication of the doctrine to any significant number of cases would produce
between the parties to other contracts, and the even more uncertain effect
that decisions favorable to excuse claims would have on the economy as a
whole.
Wallach, supra note 33, at 218. "Breaking the habit of the traditional judicial solution
of 'all-or-nothing' in any formal way seems a truly insurmountable task." Id. at 229.
20 Dawson, supra note 10, at 29.
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3. Relational Interests: A Mirror of the Present or a Vision for the
Future?
It is significant that Judge Harshbarger, in urging an expansive
and adjustment-based approach to the problem of excuse, refers to the
theoretical work of Macneil and the "relational" theory of contract.2"'
This concept of contract has been well summarized by Professor Robert
Gordon:
In the "relational" view of Macaulay and Macneil, parties
treat their contracts more like marriages than like one-night
stands. Obligations grow out of the commitment that they
have made to one another, and the conventions that the trad-
ing community establishes for such commitments; they are
not frozen at the initial moment of commitment, but change
as circumstances change; the object of contracting is not pri-
marily to allocate risks, but to signify a commitment to coop-
erate. In bad times parties are expected to lend one another
mutual support, rather than standing on their rights; each
will treat the other's insistence on literal performance as
willful obstructionism; if unexpected contingencies occur re-
sulting in severe losses, the parties are to search for equitable
ways of dividing the losses; and the sanction for egregiously
bad behavior, is always, of course, refusal to deal again.2"9
Under such a view of contract, expansion of the "excuse" doctrine is
not contrary either to "freedom of contract" or to the agreement of the
parties. Amelioration of hardship and the avoidance of unfair advan-
tage are not premised on an "excuse" external to the contract, but arise
from the very nature of the contractual relationship. In a reprise of the
fiction of "presumed intent," the parties are presumed to have intended
an open-ended relationship, with the contract providing a framework
within which adjustment may continually take place. The law functions
as a kind of gyroscopic monitor, keeping the parties on a more or less
even course. For example, it has been suggested that the "mistake" in
ALCOA was not in the contract itself, but in the assumptions as to the
208 See McGinnis, 312 S.E.2d at 772 & n.6. (Harshbarger, J., concurring). Judge
Harshbarger refers to several commentators who argue that there is a movement away
from strict application of contract terms in long-term contracts when doing so would
result in inequity. See, e.g., Macneil, supra note 24, at 865 (recognizing that long-
term, interfirm contracts commonly contain "gaps" and "flexibility" to deal with long-
range planning of the contractual relationship); Price Adjustments, supra note 10, at
421 (arguing that courts may impose adjustment on long-term contracts in which unan-
ticipated changes have occurred).
209 Gordon, supra note 25, at 569.
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nature of the relationship that the contract had established. 1'
When the focus becomes the "contractual entity,"21 specifically,
the "mutual reliance and consensual reciprocity inherent in con-
tract," 212 traditional sanctions and excuse doctrines become irrelevant
and inappropriate.21 ' This is so because they "aim not at continuing
the contractual relations but at picking up the pieces of broken con-
tracts and allocating them between the parties on some basis deemed
equitable. '21 4 A contract, particularly a long-term215 contract, is an in-
herently incomplete, evolving mechanism rather than an embodiment of
fully formulated intent-"[c]omplete consent is a mirage.
216
The relational model enshrines cooperation, placing specific uni-
lateral economic needs in a subordinate position and consigning to dam-
nation "opportunistic" advantage taking.217 The analogue is mar-
riage"" or an on-going partnership 219 and primacy is accorded the goal
of continuing the relationship. 220 From these assumptions, both a
greater receptivity to arguments of impracticability and frustration, di-
vorced from an intent-based analysis, and some form of equitable ad-
justment by the court when the parties cannot agree, follow axiomati-
cally. Only a small logical synapse need then be bridged to impose a
210 See Palay, supra note 10, at 562 ("[T]he problems Alcoa faced had less to do
with the failure of the initial contract terms, than with the failure of the contractual
relation."); id. at 564 ("Alcoa's problem was not so much a 'mistake' concerning the
price term, but rather a mistake about the importance that Essex would place on the
preservation of the relationship.").
211 Harrison, supra note 24, at 586.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 577 ("[R]eliance on the integrity or the soundness of the contract as an
entity is mutual reliance . . . . It is this type of reliance that causes one to be uncom-
fortable with a remedy that forces one party to bear the entire reliance loss.").
214 Macneil, supra note 24, at 875.
211 The emphasis on "long-term" contractual relationships, by those proposing re-
lational-based adjustment, presupposes consensus on just what is long-term. Certainly,
the virtually perpetual lease arrangement in McGinnis v. Cayton is "long-term", the
16 year agreement in ALCOA, and the 20 years covered in the Northern Indiana
agreement would generally be considered long-term. But what of the five year agree-
ment in Scullin Steel? Surely the parties there also made substantial plans in reliance
on that contract. Compare Northern Ind., 799 F.2d at 267 and McGinnis, 312 S.E.2d
at 767 and ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 56-67 with Scullin Steel Co. v. PACCAR, Inc.,
708 S.W.2d 756, 758-60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
211 Price Adjustments, supra note 10, at 375; see Macneil, supra note 24, at 865
("Two common characteristics of long-term contracts are the existence of gaps in their
planning and the presence of a range of processes and techniques used by contract
planners to create flexibility in lieu of either leaving gaps or trying to plan rigidly.").
217 See, e.g., New Spirit, supra note 10, at 207 (comparing the tort doctrine of
duty to rescue to a contract doctrine of duty to adjust, and arguing that a duty to adjust
is "necessary to avoid opportunism").
218 See Gordon, supra note 25, at 569.
219 See Harrison, supra note 24, at 592-95.
220 See Macneil, supra note 24, at 891, 893-95.
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duty upon an advantaged party to accede to a reasonable proposed
modification offered by the disadvantaged party.22 The fact that the
result of such adjustment is the creation of a compromise that neither
party may have wanted becomes secondary to the goal of fairly main-
taining the relationship. The new operative fiction then is that the law
is doing merely what the parties would have done in the interest of the
relationship had they been required to deal with the matter at its
inception.
Just as with the "efficiency" solution, however, the relational ad-
justment approach to risk allocation raises serious capability problems.
The specter of ad hoc jurisprudence and unpredictability and a radical
tilting of the precarious balance to be maintained among the conflicting
norms haunt its application. 22 Yet, the capability problem, and the
balance among competing interests, could in time be ameliorated as ex-
perience accumulates. The unique power of our incremental case sys-
tem, notwithstanding its toll on scholarly patience, is that coherent doc-
trine frequently can emerge as boundaries are adumbrated through
judicial experience. Of greater significance is the conceptual problem
inherent in applying a relational-based solution to situations in which
the relational norms have been subordinated by the parties.
At its most fundamental level, the relational construct, with its fo-
cus on adjustment, has been criticized as antithetical to the value of
contract as individual expression and responsible commercial behav-
ior.22 3 Such criticism, however, presupposes agreement on one unitary
concept of contract that is then violated by the construct. The relational
model is antithetical to fundamental concepts of contract law only if we
221 See New Spirit, supra note 10, at 206-08; Price Adjustments, supra note 10,
at 395-404 . For a highly critical reaction to Speidel's proposal, see Dawson, supra
note 10, at 30-31. See also Gillette, supra note 24, at 523 (expressing "substantial
doubt . . . that the imposition of a duty to adjust mirrors commercial reality, social
utility, or individual right.").
222 See, e.g., Kidwell, supra note 31, at 620-21 ("Doctrine that reflects a world of
long-term relationships will necessarily be less formal, hence less certain, hence less
communicative.. . . Similarly. . . the application of a new body of doctrine, founded
in the relational perspective and requiring more sophisticated fact-finding and rule-
application, would test or exceed the capability of existing legal institutions.").
223 See Gillette, supra note 24, at 571-75. Further criticism has noted that:
[T]he adjustment arguments assume a view of rational commercial behav-
ior that understates the ability of commercial actors to engage in conduct
for which they can be considered, from an ethical or behavioral perspec-
tive, responsible. . . . [We should] . . . reject recent commentary that
views contract necessarily as a communitarian exercise and instead adopt a
conception of contract as a mechanism for individual expression by com-
mercial actors capable of considering and bearing the consequences of rea-
soned choice.
Id. at 524..
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define such concepts as precluding the broader perspectives envisioned
by the model. It is no more a form of contractual blasphemy than was
the development of the excuse doctrines in the face of the theology of
pacta sunt servanda. Contractual heresy, just as contractual ortho-
doxy, is dependent upon contractual definition. Adjustment and risk-
sharing do violence only to one such definition; they are perfectly con-
sistent with the broader relational definition of contract.
Teleological problems arise, however, when we attempt to create
definition without reference to contractual reality, when we confuse
what we believe ought to be with what is. The intent-based application
of the excuse doctrine, whether through the presumed intent of an ob-
jective test of foreseeability or the search for actual intent, has been
criticized for its tenuous connection with commercial reality. Similarly,
the conceptual basis for adjustment appears to founder on the assump-
tions made as to the motivation and behavior of contracting parties. It is
assumed that parties not only share the relational model's goals of co-
operation and flexibility, but also share its priorities and order their
values accordingly.224 The underlying difficulty stems from the com-
plexity of commercial relationships and the concomitant complexity of
contractual reality. Indeed, it is that very complexity that enhances the
utility of relational concepts. The problem is in the one-dimensional
extension of these concepts to deal with events of such magnitude as to
call the relational norms into question.
The values of cooperation, flexibility, and mutual problem solving
are not only socially good, they also inform and influence commercial
life.225 However, they are not the only factors in that life. To analogize
a contractual relationship to a marriage or a partnership is helpful in
considering specific issues. To extend that analogy to the point of ex-
panding judicial intervention or imposing correlative duties on the par-
ties is to distort reality.
Whatever their relational motivations, if the parties to a contract
224 See Goldberg, supra note 10, at 531 ("Firms do not generally enter into multi-
year contracts because of their concern for the future course of prices. Rather, they
enter into the agreements to achieve the benefits of cooperation."); Palay, supra note
10, at 562 ("[P]arties who have, or anticipate, strong relational ties with their con-
tracting opposites . . . assume that the contract will be adjusted to their mutual advan-
tage as circumstances change. Since the costs of drafting, monitoring, and enforcing a
once-and-for-all agreement outweigh the benefits, it is far more efficient to cross
bridges as they are reached.").
225 In more than twenty-five years of practicing law and negotiating complex
agreements, I have rarely seen a significant contractual relationship formed when the
principals were not "comfortable" with each other. Similarly, parties will frequently
avoid troublesome or conjectural issues, assuming instead that they will, somehow,
work out their problems as they arise.
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wanted a marriage or a partnership model to regulate their conduct,
they would have chosen one. These are not esoteric or subtly differenti-
ated alternatives. They represent clear choices in ordering a relation-
ship. When sophisticated bargaining entities choose a long-term con-
tract rather than a joint venture or partnership, they consciously choose
one legal mode over another. We should not cavalierly vitiate that
choice. Motivation is complex and reaction to specific disruptive events
may often be quixotic. The occurrence of such events can cause the
parties to reexamine the relationship itself. When the parties them-
selves reorder their values and question the primacy of the relationship
and its maintenance, the relational norms break down. A system that
would perpetuate those norms after their utility to the parties ceases is
inimical to any concept of contract founded on bilateral mutuality.
In short, although the relational model offers invaluable analytic
assistance to the understanding of contracts in general and to the ra-
tionalization of much contract doctrine, it becomes essentially irrelevant
when the parties choose to elevate other values above the relational
ones. As Professor Macaulay has recently observed:
[RIelational sanctions do not always produce cooperation or
happy situations. .... We have seen litigation prompted by
major shocks to the world economic system. OPEC and the
energy crises of the 1970s provoked many cases where con-
tracts had rested on relational sanctions and assumptions
about the costs of energy. Relational considerations gave way
to the large amounts of money that businesses would have
lost had they performed their commitments.226
IV. CONCLUSION: TIME FOR ASSIMILATION
Despite all of its intuitive appeal, adjustment through direct judi-
cial intervention is not yet appropriate. Using this tool to rebuild a
contractual relationship when the relational glue between the parties
can no longer hold the relationship together requires a different envi-
ronment. That adjustment for disruptive events has been legislatively or
judicially sanctioned in other societies22 does not indicate a societal
consensus in this country or that American judges should presume such
a consensus. What Judge Teitelbaum attempted in ALCOA can be ac-
228 Macaulay, supra note 13, at 471-72.
22 See ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 93-94; see also Dawson, Judicial Revision of
Frustrated Contracts: Germany, 63 B.U.L. REV. 1039 (1983) (discussing judicial ad-
justment of contracts in Germany); Trakman, supra note 10, at 480-81 (discussing
European legislation empowering courts to adjust contracts).
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cepted only if there is consensus as to the hierarchy of contractual
norms. It is the absence of such a consensus that makes ALCOA aber-
rational and accounts for its lack of direct impact on subsequent judicial
thought. Judge Teitelbaum simply went too far, too soon, and with too
little, laying no solid conceptual groundwork to support his fragile
structure. Had ALCOA avowedly, rather than incidentally, "worked as
a form of coercive mediation"2 " or attempted to create the firmer foun-
dation for intervention coupled with respect for the settlement process
proposed by Judge Harshbarger in McGinnis v. Cayton,229 the opinion
would have justified its initial reception as a reflection of a "new spirit
of contract."
What does emanate from ALCOA's presence in contract history,
however, is a ghost image of that spirit. The seven years since ALCOA
have witnessed several tentative departures from the previously ac-
cepted method of judicial treatment of disruptive events and risk alloca-
tion. The decisions in Westinghouse I and Westinghouse II added a
higher level of sophistication and flexibility to the "traditional" intent-
based approach-the quantification of impracticability and the search
for intent through objective foreseeability. The recent disadvantaged
buyer cases have afforded the opportunity for expanding our base of
experience and testing accepted doctrine.2"' On balance, then, there
does appear to be a growing judicial willingness to examine more
closely the facts and the relative positions of the parties in these
cases.2" 1 This in itself is a perceptible expansiveness in the application
228 Macaulay, supra note 13, at 476.
229 312 S.E.2d 765, 770-82 (W. Va. 1984) (Harshbarger, J., concurring). See
supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
20 See supra note 165.
21 See, e.g., International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879
(10th Cir. 1985) (adjusting buyer's minimum purchasing requirements by relying on a
contractual provision that allowed for adjustment whenever buyer was "unable" to re-
ceive purchases for reasons beyond the parties' control, where the "inability" was the
buyer's radically reduced requirements), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1196 (1986); Wald-
inger Corp. v. CRS Group Eng'rs, Inc., 775 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1985) (excusing sup-
plier from performance under doctrine of commercial impracticability); Sharon Steel
Corp. v. Jewell Coal & Coke Co., 735 F.2d 775 (3rd Cir. 1984) (buyer's claim that
sharp drop in the market price was within the force majeure or the impracticability
clause was a plausible interpretation of the contract); Asphalt Int'l, Inc. v. Enterprise
Shipping Corp., 667 F.2d 261, 266 (2d Cir. 1981) ("The doctrine of commercial im-
practicability focuses on the reasonableness of the expenditure at issue, not upon the
ability of a party to pay the commercially unreasonable expense."); Westinghouse II,
597 F. Supp. 1456 (E.D. Va. 1984) (government's failure to timely honor its implied
commitment excused contractor from some amount of interim storage costs); McGinnis,
312 S.E.2d 765 (allegations as to possibility of mutual mistake raised potentially meri-
torious argument that precluded summary judgment); Chemical Bank v. Washington
Pub. Power Supply Sys., 102 Wash. 2d 874, 691 P.2d 524 (1984) (agreements held
unenforceable under theories of mutual mistake, commercial frustration, and impossi-
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of traditional doctrine.
Ultimately, it is not ALCOA, but the impact of events that seems
to have moved recent judicial thinking to higher ground. In a relatively
short period of time, we have witnessed sharp inflation and its equally
sharp decline; a sudden and significant escalation in fuel prices that
affected almost every aspect of commercial life and, again, just as sud-
den and just as significant a decline; and other drastic and sometimes
unexpected events that have had a significant impact on the commercial
world. Each such event forces us to adjust both the way in which con-
tractual arrangements are made and the way they are interpreted and
enforced. The formation of a coherent doctrine of excuse requires as-
similation of this experience. The task for the lawyer negotiating and
drafting agreements in this environment is immensely challenging. The
challenge to our judicial machinery is formidable and can be met only
with a kind of constructive patience. These complications cannot effec-
tively be dealt with by post hoc efficiency analysis nor is a policy of
relational oriented judicial loss-sharing yet appropriate. Sufficient ex-
perience with multi-motivated complex business arrangements may ul-
timately elevate the relational, cooperative ideals to such prominence
among participants that courts would be both capable of and justified
in applying them when the relationship has broken down. That time,
however, has not yet come, as contracting parties and the courts are still
digesting complexities that defy easy categorization.2"2
What is possible, however, is to continue to develop the sophistica-
tion of both the tools we have and their use. With all of its short-
comings, some intent-based analysis must suffice as experience is assim-
ilated. The inquiry, however, need not be bifurcated into the quantifi-
cation of impracticability and foreseeability. These analytic tools are
better applied as part of an integrated analysis of the contractual prob-
bility). But cf. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265
(7th Cir. 1986) (refusing to excuse contract obligations by virtue of doctrines of frustra-
tion or impracticability); Printing Indus. Ass'n v. International Printing & Graphic
Communications Union, Local 56, 584 F.Supp. 990 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (refusing to
reform contract under doctrines of mutual mistake or frustration of purpose); Scullin
Steel Co. v. PACCAR, 708 S.W.2d 756 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (refusing to excuse
seller's obligations under doctrine of frustration of purpose).
232 Schlegel's observation, made almost twenty years ago, before many of our cur-
rent complications began, is particularly apt:
To demand that any court determine when the obligation of a contract is
changed without a guide or standard is to ask that court to pinpoint the
instance when the difference in degree becomes the difference in
kind. . . . Faced with the task of determining whether the obligation has
changed, all that a court can do is give answers and state results . . .; it
cannot give meaningful reasons for the decisions.
Schlegel, supra note 33, at 439.
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lem presented. The inquiry should be more openly directed to a deter-
mination of whether supervening events have destroyed the "foundation
of the transaction."2 ' For the present, the context should remain one of
"excuse," an all-or-nothing solution, however unsatisfying that may be.
As a doctrine of excuse, impracticability must be applied spar-
ingly. Without an overall doctrinal consensus as to the nature of con-
tract, excusing events must be treated exceptionally. One may chafe at
the need to live with inelegant and unsatisfying doctrinal compromises
and yearn for the immediate application of a comprehensive and consis-
tent doctrinal solution. Nevertheless, expansion in application must be
incremental. By growing out of the accumulation of experience and ad-
aptation to our volatile environment, meaningful superceding doctrine
can be developed in which "stability" and "fairness" can more readily
coexist.
233 See Dawson, supra note 10, at 3; see also Speidel, supra note 5, at 271 ("The
courts have failed to focus on the critical question, whether performance 'as agreed' has
been made impracticable.").
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